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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although political liberalism entails freedom of exit for a state's own citizens, it 
does not entail freedom of entry for others.! 
Old ghosts linger in the shadows of the new Germany. Nearly half a 
century after the fall of the Third Reich, amidst the celebration of German 
t "Who are we again?" 
tt Assistant Clinical Professor, Boston College Law School. It is impossible for me to thank all of 
the many people who made this study possible and I apologize to any whom I fail to mention here. Among 
those in the United States who were especially generous with time, ideas, and friendly critique were 
George Brown, Mary Ann Glendon, Donald Kommers, Christiana Lemke, Sally Falk Moore, Gerald 
Neuman, Peter Quint, Frank Upham, and the participants at faculty presentations at Boston College Law 
School and Vermont Law School. My research in Germany was made enormously more productive and 
enjoyable by the extraordinary help and hospitality I received from Herbert J. Becher, Hildegaard Groos, 
Dr. Jiirgen Haberland, Barbara John, Dr. Peter Nicolaus, Dr. Jiirgen Sudhoff, Dr. Johannes Trommer and 
Wolfgang Weickhardt. I am particularly grateful to Dean Daniel Coquillette for his continuous financial 
and personal support. Thanks also to David Baron, Cecilia Bonner, Bert Cooper, Jennifer Ganem, Alicia 
Greenidge, and Ekaterina Vosniakou, who helped me with research. 
1. Aristide Zolberg, Contemporary Transnational Migrations in Historical Perspective, in U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 15, 16 (Mary M. Kritz ed., 1983). 
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re-unification and a chorus of wir sind wieder wer, a resurgence of 
xenophobia has become a central German political dilemma. Asylum-seekers 
and, more generally, other "foreigners, "3 have become the targets of a 
growing number of physical attacks.4 More than 2400 such assaults were 
reported in 1991, including dozens of cases of arson that resulted in severe 
injuries and deaths.s Some 2200 attacks were reported through the fIrst nine 
months of 1992.6 
An attack in late August 1992 on a building housing asylum-seekers in the 
port city of Rostock set off a new round of violence and with it, a heightened 
degree of German soul-searching.7 Indeed, although the perpetrators of these 
attacks have often been right-wing fringe groups of neo-Nazis and 
"skin-heads," the attacks and ensuing debate have been taken as evidence of 
a deeper German dilemma.8 German attitudes towards foreigners have been 
severely strained and polarized over the course of the last decade. A 1991 poll 
conducted by the Second German Television channel (ZDF) indicated that a 
majority of those surveyed felt that the asylum issue was the single most 
important issue facing Germany.9 In September 1992 the editors of the 
NUrnberger Nachrichten newspaper expressed a widespread sense that, in the 
debate over asylum and immigration, "[w]hat's really at stake are the basic 
values on which the Federal Republic is oriented."IO 
The German government and major political parties have responded to this 
"foreigner question" with ambivalence ad some confusion. The primary 
government response has been to condemn the attacks while pledging to 
reform the foreigner and asylum systems. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the 
Christian Democratic Party has called the attacks on foreigners "acts of 
barbarism" and has urged "democratic forces" to make clear that "Germany 
2. "We are somebody again" (author's translation). 
3. This term, AusUInder in German, applies to anyone who is not a German citizen or a ·status-
German" (someone of German descent who is entitled to enter Germany). As will be seen throughout this 
article, the status-Germans and Germany's restrictive ascriptive citizenship laws make the use of this word 
problematic. 
4. See, e.g., No Solution: Germany's Immigrants, ECONOMIST, Oct. 19, 1991, at 58; Attacks On 
Foreigners Continue, But Support Also Rises, WEEKlN GERMANY, Oct. 25, 1991, at 1 (published by the 
German Information Center) [hereinafter Attacks on Foreigners]; Ugly Nationalism, ECONOMIST, Sept. 
28, 1991, at 20. 
5. Attacks on Foreigners Continue, But Support Also Evident, WEEK IN GERMANY, Sept. 18, 1992, 
at 1 [hereinafter Attacks]. 
6. Id. 
7. See Xenaphobia Won't Go Away, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1992, at 55. 
8. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey, Cracks Behind the Unity, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at 14 [hereinafter, 
Dempsey, Cracks]. 
9. Attacks on Foreigners, supra note 4, at 1. Meanwhile, the German Information Center has proudly 
reported that the number of people who approve of foreigners living in Germany increased in 1991 from 
44% to 60%. Id. A 1992 survey by the Forsa Research Institute revealed that 73% of Germans still 
consider their relations with ·non-Germans" to be at least ·good.· ld. 
10. Violence Against Foreigners, WEEKlN GERMANY, Sept. 18, 1992, at 3. 
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is not xenophobic. "11 Government policy has focused recently on proposals 
to amend Germany's constitutionally-enshrined right to asylum.12 Opponents 
of such an amendment, who until recently included the main opposition party, 
the SPD (Social Democratic Party), resisted the move as a capitulation to the 
attackers and an unnecessary rejection of Germany's post-war commitment to 
human rightsY As a result, the Bundestag's initial response was to pass a 
compromise statute. By late 1992, however, mounting pressure had led the 
SPD tentatively to agree to support a change in the Basic Law, Germany's 
constitution. 14 
Before the SPD altered its position, however, Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
made a proposal that stunned many observers. On November 1, 1992, he 
threatened to declare a state of emergency (Staatsnotstand) to override the 
constitutional protections for asylum-seekers. 15 This would have been the 
first post-war suspension of the constitution; as such, it indicates how large 
the asylum issue looms in the German political arena. Another troubling 
recent action was the special agreement between Germany and Romania to 
accelerate the deportation of Romanian asylum-seekers, most of whom are 
Gypsies, from Germany; in the eyes of some, including a leader of the Gypsy 
community, this is "exactly the same as when the deportation of the Jews 
started in the 1930s."16 
The societal tensions caused by recent waves of immigrants and 
asylum-seekers, as well as by broader social and economic developments, are 
by no means confined to GermanyY Indeed, much of Western Europe has 
been racked by a deep conflict between humanitarian urges and resurgent 
nationalism against a backdrop of economic insecurity. Liberal politicians 
struggle to find a middle ground while maintaining public order. 18 
11. Kohl Callsfor 'Carefol Change' of Basic Law in Hanover Speech, WEEK IN GERMANY, Sept. 18, 
1992, at 2. 
12. See infra notes 357-372 and accompanying text. 
13. Hans-Ulrich Klose, the SPD parliamentary leader, reminded the Bundestag that the liberal asylum 
provision had been written "because thousands of Germans survived the Nazi times only because they were 
granted asylum in other countries." Rolf Soderlind, Gennan Lawmakers Urged to Curb Influx of 
Foreigners, Reuters Library Report, Apr. 30, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. 
Another opponent of the change referred to the govermnent's asylum proposal as "constitutional torture" 
(Grundrechts QuIllerei). Victor Pfaff, Flucht und Einwanderung, 25 KRrrlSCHE JuSTIz 129, 134 (1992); 
see also Tamara Jones, Gennany Plans Camps to Hold Refogee Flood, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 11, 1991, at Al 
(mentioning split among German liberals over proposed asylum amendment). 
14. See infra note 366 and accompanying text; see also GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, AGREEMENT 
ON ASYLUM AND EMIGRATION [sic] TO GERMANY (1992). 
15. Marc Fisher, Kohl's 'Emergency' Suggestion Raises Questions, Draws Criticism, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 3, 1992, at A16; see also infra notes 368-369 and accompanying text. 
16. Jonathan Kaufman, Gennany Hastens Exit of Gypsies, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. I, 1992, at I, 32. 
17. See Ugly Nationalism, supra note 4, at 20. 
18. For example, then French Prime Minister Edith Cresson, seeking to shore up defenses against 
the extreme right of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front, suggested in 1991 that illegal immigrants should 
be deported by the planeload. Ugly Nationalism, supra note 4, at 20. At a recent meeting of EC foreign 
ministers, Douglas Hurd of Great Britain called immigration "the most serious problem facing Europe." 
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Despite some similarities, however, the manifestations of xenophobia, and 
the debate over how to respond, have been far more extreme in Germany. 
Germany's history and culture, as well as its present day demographic19 and 
economic conditions,2o have intensified the internal German reaction to 
foreigners as well as the world's sensitivity to Germany's response. 
However, less attention has been paid to the social conceptions implicit in 
German legal structures, or to the role played by those structures in shaping 
German discourse about the nation's treatment of foreigners and about what 
it means to be a German.21 This article addresses the interplay between 
contemporary political· discourse in Germany and the legal structures 
governing citizenship, immigration, and the rights of asylum. 
Laws of citizenship and immigration22 do more than regulate the entry 
and status of non-citizens; they reveal much about how a nation conceives of 
itself. The United States, for example, generally views itself as a "nation of 
immigrants,"23 a view that entails a concomitant, generalized (although 
certainly idealized) acceptance of freedom of movement, ethnic diversity, and 
even multi-culturalism24 as societal desiderata.2S A German observer of 
Refugees: Keep Out, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 1992, at 64. 
19. Poor conditions in eastern Europe, the war in Yugoslavia, and the 1,300 Ian open border to the 
East have led to a sharp increase in the number of those entering Germany to seek asylum over the past 
three years. Nearly 320,000 asylum-seekers entered Germany over the first nine months of 1992, as 
compared with some 256,000 in all of 199'1 and 193,000 in 1990. In 1991 Germany received more than 
60% of all asylum applications filed within the European Community. Dempsey, Cracks, supra note 8, 
at 14. 
20. The economic effects of reunification, coupled with the world recession, have been enormous. 
In November 1992, leading German economic officials predicted that western Germany would experience 
zero real growth in 1993. Unemployment was expected to rise in the west by about 340,000 from a level 
of 1.8 million, and in the east by 150,000 from a level of 1.1 million. Quentin Peel, Zero Growth 
Expected in 1993: Forecast by 'Five WISe Men' Gloomiest Yet Over Economic Prospects, FIN. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 1992, at 1. 
21. In this article, the terms "legal structures" and "legal discourse" include law itself(constitutional, 
statutory, administrative, or judge-made). The term "political/legal discourse" means governmental, 
political, and scholarly statements that purport to be interpretations of or justifications for specific legal 
structures as well as statements that implicitly rely upon legal structures for their meaning. While this 
terminology arguably conflates categories that for other purposes might usefully be separated, the basic 
point is broadly to distinguish discourse that refers (explicitly or implicitly) to law from that which does 
not. 
22. This article occasionally uses the term "immigration law· to refer to all definitional and 
procedural categories pertaining to the entry, residence, and status of aliens (or foreigners) and citizens. 
This has become standard usage in the United States, but in Germany the categories tend to be more 
distinct. However, German law has no category of Einwanderungsrecllt, the literal translation for 
immigration law. 
23. While the United States in fact did not become a nation of immigrants (as opposed to colonists) 
until more than half a century after obtaining independence, Zolberg, supra note I, at 22, the ideal of 
immigration always had been an important part of the distinctive American psyche. The Declaration of 
Independence itself complained of actions that impeded immigration and naturalization. THI! DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776). 
24. There is, of course, vigorous debate in the United States between proponents of a "melting pot" 
and those advocating "cultural pluralism.· See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THI! DISUNITING OF 
AMERICA 36 (1992). 
25. These ideals have hardly been uncontroversial. Indeed, the very idea of the "melting pot" grew 
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U.S. immigration law might well be struck by a dissonance between ideal and 
practice. Nonetheless, the same observer would see that when the U.S. 
government seeks to ban aliens because of their political opinions, to maintain 
national origin quotas, to enact racial barriers, or to interdict Haitian refugees 
in the Caribbean, dissenting arguments that such actions are "un-American" 
resonate powerfully. 26 The situation in Germany is remarkably different. At 
base, Germans are deeply ambivalent about any form of national multi-
culturalism. Many Germans believe that: 
For Americans to understand the psychological underpinnings of the current debate 
among Germans on how to deal with immigration, it is necessary to realize that, 
unlike the multi-ethnic tapestry of the U.S., the nation-states of purope have 
traditionally been ethnically homogeneous.27 
In Germany, there is no assimilationist, unifying ideal that would make 
"diversity itself a source of national identity and unity. ,,28 
Rather, German immigration laws reveal a strong tension between two 
competing social conceptions. One is a post-war vision wedded to ideals of a 
liberal, open society that is strongly committed to constitutionally-protected 
human rights. The other is a more restrictive conception that stems from a 
number of sometimes complementary, and sometimes conflicting influences. 
These include economic concerns, mono-cultural tendencies, and the remnants 
of ethnic or vOlldsch nationalism in German thought. 
The former conception is evident in Germany's openness to asylum-
out of a desire to respond to an increasing opposition to further immigration, an opposition that often had 
ugly racial or ethnic overtones. See, e.g., HENRY P. FAIRCHILD, THE MELTING POT MISTAKE 9 (1926). 
Much modern scholarship has focused on the way in which u.s. immigration law has subverted or at least 
failed to implement what most scholars see as our better ideals. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The 
Meaning of 'Persecution' in United States Asylum Law, 3 !NT'L J. REFUGEE LAW 5 (1991) (criticizing 
excessive emphasis on specific causes of persecution); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States 
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987) (criticizing 
continued reliance on ·prerights jurisprudence· in modern U.S. Immigration Law); Daniel Kanstroom, 
Hello Darlatess: Involuntary Testimony and Silence as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 599 (1990) (analysis of Immigration Judges' practice of drawing adverse inference from 
refusal to testify in deportation proceedings); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication, 138 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990) (arguing that better functioning adjudication process would solve systemic 
problems in U.S. asylum law); James A. R. Nafziger, Review of Visa Denials By Consular Officers, 66 
WASH. L. REv. 1 (1991) (critiquing reliance on ambiguous and often antiquated authority); Ibrahim J. 
Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 51 (1989) (criticizing judicial use of legal 
fictions in immigration law). Despite all of this, the "nation of immigrants" ideal is a strong part of the 
American identity and myth system. 
26. Such actions are ·un-American" both because they might violate laws such as the First 
Amendment or the Equal Protection clause, and because they offend the "nation of immigrants" concept. 
For example, when Harry Truman vetoed the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act (in vain), he said not only that 
its national origins quotas were unfair, unwise, and even unconstitutional, but also that the concept was 
·utterly unworthy of our traditions and our ideals· and a denial of "the humanitarian creed inscribed 
beneath the Statue of Liberty." Immigration Bill Veto, 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 921, 923. 
27. GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER, PUB. No. XI/91, Focus ON .•• FOREIGNERS IN GERMANY 2 
(1991) [hereinafter Focus]. 
28. LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE AMERICAN KALEIDOSCOPE 492 (1990). For discussion of the German 
government's approach to integration, see infra notes 385-394 and accompanying text. 
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seekers and the lengths to which Germany goes to safeguard the rights of 
foreigners on German soil. Germany boasts a constitutional system of basic 
human rights as well as administrative and judicial systems that are among the 
most protective of non-citizens' rights in the world.29 Most significantly, 
Article 16 of the German Basic Law explicitly grants the "politically 
persecuted" a right to asylum.30 
The latter strain manifests itself most clearly in the German citizenship and 
naturalization regimes, among the most restrictive in the western world. 31 
German law adheres today, as it has since the nineteenth century, to the pure 
jus sanguinis model, which confers citizenship by right to blood relations 
only, and not to those born on German soil. Therefore, German citizenship 
is available to most foreigners, including those born and raised in Germany, 
only through discretionary naturalization proceedings. This, along with a 
variety of other legal, administrative, and cultural barriers, serves to keep 
naturalization rates in Germany among the lowest in the western world.32 
Moreover, German constitutional and statutory law grant an automatic right 
to German nationality to so-called German VolkszugehOrige (members of the 
(German) people (Volk)). As discussed below, this ethnic-based right of return 
has long been criticized as betraying a remaining strand of vtJlkisch or racial 
thinking within German law.33 
The tension between these two ideals - one rather open, multi-cultural, 
and based on general principles of human rights, the other closed, 
mono-cultural, and based to some degree on lingering ethnic-nationalism -
has been present in German immigration law since the founding of the 
post-war Federal Republic.34 Recent immigration pressures and the national-
ist sentiments accompanying re-unification have highlighted the conflict 
significantly. Consideration of these unresolved tensions offers insight into the 
current social debate raging in Germany over German nationalism,3s 
29. See irifra notes 121-123, 269-85 and accompanying text. 
30. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 16 (Federal Ministries of the Interior, Justice, and Finance 
trans., 1991) (Editor's note: unless otherwise noted, all references to the Grundesgesetz are to this edition). 
31. See infra notes 134-225 and accompanying text. 
32. See William Rogers Brubaker, Citizenshipand Naturalization, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS 
OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA 99, 118-120 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989) 
[hereinafter CITIzENSHIP IN EUROPE]. 
33. See irifra notes 228-250, 377-379, and 400 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 91-127 and accompanying text. 
35. The problem of attacks on foreigners in Germany and the increasing calls for sharp restrictions 
on immigration and asylum processes generally are often described as part of a resurgence of "German 
nationalism." See, e.g., Ugly Nationalism, supra note 4, at 20; Manfred Zuleeg, Der unvollkommene 
NationaIstaat als Einwanderungsland, 1987 ZEUSCHRIFT FOR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 188. Despite the 
emergence of a virtual cottage industry devoted to the study of the subject, nationalism proves remarkably 
difficult to define. See, e.g., ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 88-99 (1983) (discussing "a 
typology of nationalisms H). The essence of nationalism is the concept of the "nation" and its linkage to the 
·state •• The definitions of both of these predicate terms have, however, also come to be highly refined. 
One can trace two distinctive European traditions regarding the concept of the state. The first tradition, 
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xenophobia, and racism. Moreover, the outcome of the debate will have 
profound implications for the shape and direction the new Germany will take. 
Part II of this article describes the current demographic situation in 
Germany. Part ill discusses the history and current status of the most 
important German legal structures relating to foreigners: the Basic Law, 
citizenship, alienage, and asylum laws, and the unique regime facilitating the 
return to Germany of ethnic Germans dispersed across Europe.36 In so 
doing, part ill attempts to reveal both how German legal structures shape 
current events and how the law itself reflects conflicting social conceptions. 
Part IV discusses government and political discourse on immigration law, 
pointing to policy proposals and political rhetoric that exhibit the powerful 
effects of the law on popular debate. 
II. FOREIGNER DEMOGRAPHICS IN GERMANY 
A. Non-Ethnic Germans 
Germany is presently home to more than five million foreigners, who 
constitute some seven percent of the popUlation of the former Bundesrepublik, 
where most of them still live.37 In some areas, such as metropolitan 
Frankfurt, foreigners constitute more than twenty percent of the population. 
Berlin, the former Reich capital, and now once again the great symbol of 
German power and identity, has the third largest metropolitan Turkish 
population in the world.38 The 1.8 million Turks in Germany are Germany's 
which finds expression in Locke's Second Treatise, sees the state as existing primarily to protect private 
interests. See generally JOHN LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Reardon ed., 
1952). This conception, often linked to natural rights theory, a clear public/private split, and what later 
came to be called the "night-watchman" state, was powerfully challenged by a view that was first fully 
expressed by Rousseau's Social Contract. The basic building blocks of this challenge were a distinctive 
idea of "civil liberty" as a positive, substantive, political goal, and the corporativist conception of the state 
as subject (the "general will"). See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
(Will moore Landall trans., 1954). This second tradition tends to be more consonant with closed 
conceptions of the polity, though this is not inevitable. 
There are two very different modern uses of the term "nationalism." Patriotic nationalism denotes 
"[t]he revolutionary concept of the nation as constituted by the deliberate political option of its potential 
citizens". See ERIC J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 at 88 (1990). Revolutionary 
France and the United States are the classic exemplars. VlJlkisch nationalism relates to a nation myth that 
is largely defined by race, culture, or ethnicity. See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 32, at 8 (defining Volk-
centered nationalism). 
36. A variety of multilateral European initiatives on citizenship, immigration, and asylum have 
already significantly affected Germany, a pattern likely to continue in the future. Most generally, the move 
toward some sort of European Community citizenship could mitigate significantly Germany's restrictive 
approach to ascriptive citizenship and naturalization. This issue, while important, is beyond the scope of 
this article. More specifically, the so-called Schengen process, which addresses asylum, tends to support 
calls for restriction of Germany's liberal constitutional asylum policy. See infra notes 343-53 and 
accompanying text. 
37. See Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and Narionhood in Gennany, in BRUBAKER, CrrIZENSlllP IN 
EUROPE, supra note 32, at 71. 
38. Letter from Jiirgen Haberland, Adviser to the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, to Daniel 
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largest non-German ethnic group. The other main groups are former 
Yugoslavians (780,000), Italians (560,000), Greeks (337,000), Spanish 
(135,000), and Portuguese (93,000).39 
The vast majority of foreigners in Germany today entered former West 
Germany. The former German Democratic Republic, however, also had some 
non-German residents. Government statistics indicate that when the Berlin 
Wall was opened in 1989 there were 88,100 foreign workers living in East 
Germany. This workforce was mostly Vietnamese (59,000), Mozambican 
(15,100), and Cuban (8,000). Most of these workers were strictly controlled 
by both the East German government and their own governments. They lived 
in dormitories and were rarely able to bring family members.40 
Some sixty percent of the foreigners in Germany today have resided there 
for ten or more years. At least one million are children who were born in 
Germany. In fact, more than two-thirds of foreign children in Germany were 
born in Germany.41 The great majority of these long-term and German-born 
foreigners entered or were born to those who entered under the ill-fated 
Gastarbeiter labor recruitment program of 1955-1973.42 
German commentators sometimes note that the link between foreigners and 
labor is no longer as strong as it once was.43 By 1983, for instance, only 
thirty-eight per cent of the foreign population in Germany was employed. The 
reasons for this, however, are complex. For one thing, many of the foreigners 
in Germany today are children. Also, the government has not permitted 
certain groups of foreigners, such as asylum applicants, to work.44 Nonethe-
less, the research institute of the Federation of German Industries has 
concluded that some areas of public life, such as garbage collection, janitorial 
services, and food services would "collapse" without foreign workers.4s 
Kanstroom (July 16, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter Haberland Letter]. 
39. The Turks in particular present serious cultural problems for Germans. They are generally 
darker-skinned than Germans, and adhere to what seem to many Germans to be strange religious and 
family practices. Germans often speak about the strong odors of Turkish cooking, Turks' sometimes 
violent patriarchal attitudes, their mistreatment of women, etc. Islamic extremism is also often cited by 
both liberal and conservative Germans as a problem among the Turks. Even those Germans who tend to 
support multi-culturalism as an ideal often feel deeply troubled by the anti-liberal attitudes of many Turkish 
residents. See generally JOHN ARDAGH, GERMANY AND THE GERMANS 241-42 (1987). 
40. Focus, supra note 27, at 4. 
41. Dr. Horst Waffenschmidt, Parliamentary Secretary to the Federal Interior Minister, Address for 
Bad Bramstedter Lecture Series on the theme "Germany - A Country of Immigration?" (Mar. 2, 1992) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Waffenschmidt Speech]. 
42. The Federal Republic of Germany began recruiting guest-workers (Gastarbeiter) in the 19608 to 
fill labor shortages during the post-war "economic miracle." By 1973, the need for foreign workers had 
diminished and Germany officially ended its recruitment programs. Many of the workers stayed, however, 
and ultimately brought spouses and started families in Germany. RUSSELL J. DALTON, POLITICS IN WEST 
GERMANY 87-90 (1989). 
43. See Hailbronner, supra note 37, at 71. 
44. But see infra notes 338-340 and accompanying text (noting some asylum applicants now granted 
employment authorization under 1991 change in law). 
45. Focus, supra note 27, at 4. 
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B. Asylum-Seekers 
A second important group of foreigners in Germany are the Asylanten who 
entered the country to take advantage of West Germany's unique constitutional 
right of asylum.46 Through the early 1970s the right to asylum was not a 
major social issue in Germany because the number of applicants was quite 
small.47 Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the number of asylum 
applications rose dramatically - from 51,493 in 1979 to 107,818 in 1980.48 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the numbers continued to rise - 103,076 
in 1988,49 121,318 in 1989/0 193,063 in 199OS1 and 256,112 in 1991.52 
In 1992, the figure jumped to 430,191.53 
Conversations with many Germans reveal a high degree of skepticism 
about the asylum-seekers. Indeed, though a majority of respondents to a 1992 
survey conducted by the Interior Ministry supported the basic constitutional 
right to asylum, seventy-five percent believed that most asylum-seekers were 
"misusing the right."54 The government clearly shares this skepticism. In 
1991 the denial rate in the first instance55 was seventy-six percent.56 In fact, 
from 1953 to the end of 1991, the administrative agency in charge of asylum 
recognized only 156,980 (11.26%) of all asylum-seekers as bona fide. 57 
However, due to extensive rights of judicial review, the seriousness with 
which the judiciary takes its role in these cases,58 and the possibility that a 
state (Land) government will grant residence on humanitarian grounds, only 
a small percentage of initially-denied asylum-seekers have actually been 
deported to date. 59 
As in the United States, where long delays in asylum cases are also 
common, such facts are subject to a variety of interpretations. Kay 
Hailbronner, a leading German authority on citizens and aliens laws, asserts 
46. See infra note 302 and accompanying text (discussing right to asylum). 
47. For example, through the mid-1970s there were less than 10,000 asylum applicants per year. 
Focus, supra note 45, at 4. 
48. Id. at 6. 
49. Political Asylum Seekers, WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 15, 1993, at 2. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Attacks, supra note 6, at 1. 
55. See infra notes 321-329 and accompanying text (discussing administrative procedures). 
56. Hans-Ingo von Pollern, Die EmwicklWlg der Asylbewerberzahlenim Jahre 1981, 1982 
ZEITSCHRIFI' FOR AUSLANDERREClIT UND AUSLANDERPOLITIK [ZAR] 24, 29. 
57. Id. 
58. One judge in Cologne said that he takes personal responsibility for researching not only the legal 
issues presented by asylum appeals, "but the factual background data as well. Given the enormous 
complexity of these cases, delays of many months and even years are understandable. Interview with Judge 
X, in KOIn (June 1990) (the judge requested anonymity) [hereinafter Judge X Interview]. 
59. Focus, supra note 27, at 5. In 1989, for example, only 6% of denied asylum-seekers were 
deported, while 15% left on their own, and 18% were "unaccounted for." Id. 
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that "strangely enough [the right of asylum] has been interpreted as an 
individual right for everybody who claims to be persecuted for political 
reasons to get a residence permit for the duration of the asylum proceed-
ings. "60 Others allege that asylum applicants are not bona fide political 
refugees, but are really "economic refugees" who "play the system." As the 
German Information Center puts it, 
[i]t has since become obvious that more and more people are no longer fleeing 
from individual political persecution, but from war and poverty in Third World 
countries and from chaos in Eastern Europe .... Affluent West Germany, with 
its generous social services, has become a prime European destination for 
asylum-seekers.61 
By contrast, supporters of the asylum-seekers question the validity of the rigid 
distinction between political and economic refugees and cite the necessity of 
maintaining a constitutional basis for asylum claims.62 Nevertheless, a 
consensus now seems to be emerging in favor of at least expediting asylum 
procedures to eliminate long delays that asylum-seekers are able to use to 
"manipulate" the system.63 
C. Ethnic Germans 
The third group important to the foreigners debate are technically64 not 
foreigners at all. Nevertheless, because they are not native-born Germans, the 
so-called Vertriebene ("expellees") and Aussiedler ("out-settlers,,)6S are still 
potential immigrants, and therefore are very much a part of the immigration 
debate. 
Since at least the thirteenth century various groups of ethnic Germans have 
emigrated from Central Europe and established communities elsewhere. These 
communities have tended to be cohesive and durable, and range from the 
Americas to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In Europe, the rise 
of German National Socialism and the Second World War had terrible 
consequences for many of the German enclaves outside the Reich. 66 After the 
war millions of people who identified themselves or were identified as 
Germans faced massive forced resettlement and expulsion from Eastern 
60. Hailbronner, supra note 37, at 72. 
61. Focus, supra note 27, at 4. 
62. Pfaff, supra note 13, at 136-38. 
63. Perhaps the most tangible proof of this consensus was the apparent support of the major parties 
for legislation to amend the Basic Law to limit the right to asylum. See Coalition Parties and SPD Debate 
Proposed Asylum Legislation in First Reading, WEEK IN GERMANY, Jan. 22, 1993, at 1. 
64. See infra notes 251-52 and accompanying text (giving constitutional and statutory definition of 
foreigner). 
65. The Aussiedler are ethnic Germans who wish to emigrate to Germany from across much of 
Europe. 
66. Frequent changes in the territorial boundaries of the German state from 1871 through 1949 render 
even the basic "inside/outside" distinction problematic. 
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Europe and the Soviet Union; the generally accepted figure is that some 12.5 
million ethnic Germans67 were driven from or fled their communities in the 
immediate post-war period.68 Of this group, some eight million managed to 
enter the territory of the Bundesrepublik (West Germany) by 1949.69 
However, about 3.5 million ethnic Germans remained in Eastern Europe.7o 
The founders of the Federal Republic and the framers of the Basic Law 
were determined to aid this group of diaspora ethnic Germans, who were 
called Expellees (Vertriebene). The predominant impulse at the time was 
undoubtedly humanitarian. The argument was generally made71 that Germany 
had an historical responsibility to help these people who were perceived as 
victims of what conservative German historians, following Meinecke, called 
the "German catastrophe."72 The government has virtually always down-
played the implicitly volkisch aspects of the Aussiedler program in favor of 
this humanitarian focus, and mainstream German politicians have almost never 
asserted that ethnic Germans were entitled to special treatment solely because 
of their ethnicity. 73 What most clearly distinguishes Aussiedler from other 
asylum-seekers or immigrants, however, is their ethnicity. 
Article 116(1) of the Basic Law provides the Aussiedler with a right to 
resettle in Germany. This article defines Germans to include both citizens and 
VolkszugehOrige.74 A 1953 statute defined VolkszugehOrige as "whoever in 
their homeland has acknowledged German nationality and can confirm it 
through characteristics like parentage, language, upbringing or culture. ,,75 
The statute covered anyone meeting this definition, not just those expelled 
from their homes at the end of World War 11.76 Those who have entered 
Germany under the statute but were not expelled from their countries in the 
67. The term "ethnic" does not fully capture the meaning of the German term VolkszugehlJrige used 
to describe this group of people. See infra notes 227-250 and accompanying text. 
68. See generally Orro HAUBER ET AL., DIE STATUSFESTSTELLUNG NACH DEM BUNI?ESVER-
TRIEBENENGESETZ (1990). 
69. Some 4.1 million entered the DDR (East Germany) and approximately 400,000 went to Austria. 
ld. at 2. 
70. Ill. at 2. 
71. ld. at 2. 
72. FRIEDRICH MEINECKE, DIE DEUTSCHE }CATASTROPHE: BETRACHTUNGEN UND ERINNERUNGEN 
(1946). 
73. In fact, in a recent speech on immigration CDU Parliamentary State Secretary for the Interior 
Ministry Dr. Horst Waffenschmidt asserted that post-war Germany had never pursued a Volkstum Politik 
(roughly: a vlJlldsch policy agenda). Waffenschmidt Speech, supra note 41. 
74. GG art. 116(1). Note that only "expellees" have a right to naturalize under Article 116(1). In 
practice, however, the German government has treated almost all ethnic Germans as expellees in order 
to allow them to obtain German citizenship under Article 116(1). 
75. Gesetziiber die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Fliichtlinge, May 19, 1953, BGB!. 1201, 
§ 6 [hereinafter BVFG]. 
76. ld. § 1 ("[Venriebene (expellees) include all citizens and VolkszugehlJrige who] after the 
conclusion of the general [post-war] expulsion measures leave or have left the German eastern territories 
under foreign administration, Danzig, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, or Albania.") (author's translation). 
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immediate aftermath of World War II are called Aussiedler.77 
In the last twenty years some 1,900,000 Aussiedler, mostly from Poland, 
Romania, and the former Soviet Union, have entered Germany.78 In 1990, 
for example, 147,950 entered from the Soviet Union, 133,872 from Poland, 
and 111,150 from Romania.79 The numbers declined somewhat in 1991, to 
about 220,000.80 Interior Ministry officials who handle Aussiedler claims 
estimate that there may be as many as 3,500,000 or more potential Aussiedler 
still outside Germany, nearly equal to the total number of "foreigners" in 
Germany today. 81 
Notwithstanding their history and presumptive genetic make-up, many of 
these people do not, even to many Germans, appear "German." Many speak 
different languages, dress differently from Germans, and so forth. Like 
"culture," however, Germanity largely seems to be in the eye of the beholder. 
Moreover, until quite recently, the German government consistently (and 
generously) viewed the Aussiedler as German. One author summarized the 
German government's position with the following anecdote: 
Francis Josef, a thirty-six-year-old, is not such a clear-cut case. He is a miner and 
comes from Poland; he speaks, reads and understands only Polish. In the space 
after the question "Nationality?" on the German form, he has written "Polish." A 
German interviewer crosses out this faux pas and prints in the word "German" 
instead. Three lines on the miner's forehead come together. But the West German 
government is so eager to help the settlers that it overlooks such infractions. 
Francis Josef has Germans in his family - he has passed the test. "There," the 
official says, and dismisses him. "Now your name is Franz. ,,81 
The government's hospitality towards the Aussiedler has not gone unques-
tioned by Germans, particularly as the number of Aussiedler immigrating to 
Germany has risen and as the mass exodus of former East Germans has 
become an important social dilemma in former West Germany. 83 Heinrich 
Lummer, a conservative politician, said in 1989 that some of the "ethnic" 
Germans had so little to do with Germany that their closest link was that they 
"perhaps once owned a German Shepherd dog."84 In addition, while some 
Germans occasionally had distinguished the more II German" Aussiedler from 
the less so (on the basis of characteristics like cleanliness, order, or industry), 
the recent tensions between East Germans and West Germans have rendered 
such distinctions increasingly problematic and less common. 
Germany's reunification has intensified public debate about the Aussiedler. 
77. See infra notes 227-250 and accompanying text. 
78. Statistics provided by the German Information Center, New York (on file with author). 
79. ld. 
80. Haberland Letter, supra note 38. 
81. See UTE KNIGHT & WOLFGANG KOWALSKY, DEursCHLAND NUR DEN DEursCHEN1165 n.3 
(1991). 
82. AMITY SHLAES, GERMANY - THE EMPlRE WITHIN 23-24 (1990). 
83. ld. at 152-55. 
84. ld. at 34. 
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To some extent the legitimacy of the "right of return" stemmed from its 
linkage to the somewhat less problematic goal of German re-unification. 
Permitting the return of dispersed Germans was linked, in the public's mind, 
to the ideal of a divided Germany made whole once again. Reunification thus 
diminished the justification for the Aussiedler programs. Today, the German 
government is moving to limit the Aussiedler's return.8S A 1990 statute 
requires most Aussiedler to apply for admission into Germany from abroad.86 
The number of Aussiedler admitted to Germany declined from 397,000 in 
1990 to 222,000 in 1991,87 but there remains a backlog of 700,000 applica-
tions.88 To the extent that official limits on the return of Aussiedler are a 
response to popular demand, it appears that a more state-based nationalism or 
concern for economic well-being has replaced volkisch nationalism. 
Whatever the policy on Aussiedler, there remains a clear legal distinction 
between them and other foreigners. 89 
In sum, the German conception of "foreigners" is rather complex. Most 
of the children and grandchildren of the "guest workers" who formed an 
indispensable economic foundation of the Wirtschaftswunder (economic 
miracle), people who were born in Germany and have lived their whole lives 
there, are foreigners. They remain so partly because they lack the proper 
bloodlines under the German citizenship laws, and partly because German 
naturalization processes tend to discourage applications for naturalization. On 
the other hand, millions of people with virtually no practical connection to 
Germany are Germans by law and in the popular imagination. 
ill. THE UNDERLYING STRUCTURES OF GERMAN LAW 
Nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our 
time.90 . 
A. Constitutional Ambivalence 
German jurisprudence has interpreted post-war constitutional law91 and 
ideology as a reaction against the ideology of Nazism. Thus, the German 
Constitutional Court has observed that "[u]nderlying· the Basic Law are 
85. See Dempsey, Cracks, supra note 8, at 14. 
86. Gesetz zur Regelung des Aufuahmeverfahrens fiir Aussiedler (Aussiedleraufuahmegesetz - AAG) 
of June 28, 1990, reprinted in 1990 SAMMELBLATI FOR RECHrSVORSCHRIFTEN DES BUNDES UND DER 
LANDER 1751 [hereinafter 1990 AAG). 
87. See Dempsey, Cracks, supra note 8, at 14. 
88. ld. 
89 •. See infra notes 227-250 and accompanying text. 
90. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 3 (1991). 
91. The GRUNDGESETZ was meant to be a transitional document pending re-unification. In 1989, 
however, East Germany was incorporated into the West through the mechanism of former Article 23, 
167 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 168 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
principles for the structuring of the state that may be understood only in the 
light of the historical experience and the spiritual-moral confrontation with the 
previous system of National Socialism. ,,92 Germany is now a stable constitu-
tional democracy with a strong commitment to the rule of law in general and 
to constitutional law in particular. In the post-war period the new Federal 
Constitutional Court became one of the world's most powerful and influential 
courts, and "the principal symbol of the role of law in the eyes of most 
German citizens. "93 The Constitutional Court withdrew somewhat from the 
positivism of the earlier German Rechtsstaat - which assumed that positive 
law, enacted by the legislature, defmed precisely and fully the rights and 
duties of all Germans - in favor of a philosophy that allows the Court to 
review positive law and ensure its conformity to the Basic Law.94 
The post-war German legal system's recognition of fundamental human 
rights marks a decisive break with Germany's jurisprudential past. Article 1 
of the Basic Law asserts that "the dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and 
protect it is the duty of all state authority. "95 The Basic Law upholds 
fundamental rights (Jedermann Grundrechte or "rights of everyone") to which 
all persons in Germany are entitled. These include the right to the "free 
development" or "unfolding of one's personality" (insofar as this right does 
not violate the "rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or 
against morality"),96 and the right to equality before the law without 
disadvantage or favor stemming from sex, parentage, race, language, 
homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions.97 
In addition to recognizing these elemental rights, the Basic Law also 
embodies communitarian values. Thus, the Sozialstaat (Social State) 
principle98 guarantees economic and social welfare rights99 that go well 
beyond U.S. constitutional interpretation. loo The juxtaposition of the 
which applied to the entry of Lllnder into the BRD. GG art. 23. Therefore, it was not necessary to rewrite 
the Basic Law, and it remains the German constitution. 
92. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1975,39 BVerfGE 1, 67. 
93. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY xi (1989) [hereinafter KOMMERS, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE]. 
94. Id. at 42. 
95. GG art. 1. 
96. GG art. 2. 
97. GG art. 3. 
98. This principle requires the government to assume a certain responsibility for the needs of the 
people. Although it does not appear in the Basic Law as such, it is generaIly held to derive from Article 
20, which defines Germany as a ·social federal state, • and Article 28(1), which mandates a constitutional 
regime of ·social government based on the rule of law·. GG arts. 20, 28(1); see KOMMERS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 93, at 247. 
99. KOMMERS, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 93, at 34-68, 248. 
100. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (evidentiary hearing not required 
to satisfy requirement of procedural due process in context of termination of disability benefits); Goldberg 
v. KeIly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (hearing required to satisfy procedural due process in context of 
termination of state welfare benefits). 
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Sozialstaat principle and the human rights principles creates a tension in the 
Basic Law. Communitarian legal structures, although sometimes argued to be 
both a metaphysical and political improvement over "rights" discourse, 101 
may also highlight the distinction between those who are within the commu-
nity and those who are outside of it.l02 The more benefits one receives by 
virtue of membership in the community, the more attractive restrictive 
membership criteria become.103 As such, the defmition of the German 
community is critical. 
For forty years the Preamble to the Basic Law expressly invoked an 
extra-territorial conception of the "German people" by stating that "[t]he entire 
German people are called upon to achieve in free self-determination the unity 
and freedom of Germany. "104 This passage expressed both ethnic national-
ism and the political goal of reunification. After reunification the Preamble 
was amended to state: "The Germans . . . have achieved the unity and 
freedom of Germany in free self-determination. The Basic Law is thus valid 
for the entire German people. "105 This reformulation removes reunification 
as an issue, but leaves the major question of how to defme "the Germans," 
a question that lies at the core of modern German constitutionalism. 
The Basic Law specifically limits certain fundamental rights to "Germans," 
including the right to assemble peaceably, 106 the right to form partnerships, 
associations, and corporations,107 freedom of movement throughout Germa-
ny,108 the right to choose an occupation, place of work, study, or train-
ing,I09 the right not to be extradited,Ilo the right to resist overthrow of 
constitutional [state] order,111 the right to uniform rights and duties in each 
101. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, LmERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
102. The combination of communitarian foundations and some remnants of vlJlkisch nationalist ideas 
in German legal structures conflicts sharply with the otherwise contractarian and rights-based nature of 
the Basic Law. The basic tension, as Donald Kommers has put it, is that: "[the Basic Law's] image of man 
is of a person rooted in and defined by a certain kind of human community. Yet in the German 
constitutionalist view the person is also a transcendent being far more important than any collectivity. " 
Donald P. Kommers, IheJurisprudence a/Free Speech in the U.S. and the Federal Republic a/Gennany, 
53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 677 (1980). 
103. An example of this phenomenon is the resentment many Germans feel over government 
provision of housing, stipends, and employment authorization to asylum-seekers, especially in hard 
economic times. See infra notes 337-340 and accompanying text. 
104. GG pmbl. (Federal Ministry of Justice and Federal Ministry of Finance trans., 1989). For a 
discussion of the origins of this phrase in the Preamble, see THEODOR MAUNZ ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM 
GRUNDGESETZ B1-10 to Bl-12 (1991). 
105. GG pmbl. (1991). 
106. GG art. 8. 
107. GG art. 9. 
108. GG art. 11. 
109. GG art. 12. 
110. GG art. 16. 
111. GG art. 20. 
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Land,112 and eligibility for public office.1I3 Only those important rights 
known as Jedermann Grundrechte (rights of everyone) are available to 
non-Germans. These include most of the general fundamental rights discussed 
above. 114 Apart from Article 116(1), which covers expellees and (with 
statutory clarification) Aussiedler,115 however, the Basic Law defines the 
term "German" only as follows: "[u]nless otherwise provided by law, a 
German within the meaning of this Basic Law is a person who possesses 
German citizenship." The defmition of citizenship is left to statutory law. 
The Basic Law also uses the term das Yolk (the people). Article 20(2)(1), 
known as the popular sovereignty clause, provides that "All state power 
emanates from the people. "116 There has been much debate recently in 
Germany about who "the people" are. ll7 The term encompasses, at a 
minimum, citizens and those people covered by Article 116(1) (Expellees and 
Aussiedler).118 The phrase does not include resident foreigners, even those 
born and raised in Germany; they clearly fall into a category like that of alien 
in the United States. 
In German law, therefore, there are in fact three categories of people: 
citizens, non-citizen Germans, and foreigners or aliens. Virtually all modern 
constitutions and legal systems distinguish between citizens and others, and to 
the extent that the German/alien dichotomy is functionally equivalent to other 
states' citizen/alien line, the structure of the Basic Law is quite typical of 
Western liberal constitutional systems. Germany's system is different, 
however, because the Aussiedler provisions give it an inherently vlJlkisch 
content, and because German law and policies discourage naturalization by 
those not considered to be ethnic Germans.119 
Post-war German jurisprudence has sought to mitigate the effects of the 
distinction between Germans (including citizens and non-citizen Germans) and 
112. GG art. 33(1). 
113. GG art. 33(2). 
114. See, e.g., GG art. 1 (dignity of man inviolable): GG art. 2 (right of free development of 
personality): GG art. 3 (equality before law). For a fuller discussion of the rights of aliens in Germany 
see infra notes 251-301 and accompanying text. 
115. See infra notes 227-234 and accompanying text. 
116. GG art. 20(2) ("Aile Staatsgewaltgeht vom Volke aus"): see also GG art. 21(1) ("[t]he political 
parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the people"): GG art. 56 (presidential oath 
of office dedicated to "well-being of the German people"); GG art. 146 ("[t]his Basic Law, which is valid 
for the entire German people"). 
117. See Gerald L. Neuman, "We are the People": Alien SUffrage in German and American 
Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 259, 267-68 (1992) [hereinafter Neuman, Suffrage]. 
118. The Federal Constitutional Court has expressly limited the right to vote in local elections to "the 
German people" and denied the right to vote to foreigners. In one of the two constitutional decisions on 
the question, the Court subsumed both German citizens and the so-called status Deutsche within the 
"German people" category. The Aussiedler were called an exception to the general principle that 
citizenship is the key qualification for membership in the people and for voting rights. Judgment of Oct. 
31, 1990 (BVerfGE), reprinted in 1990 EUROPAlSCHE GRUNDREClITE-ZElTSCHRIFf 438, 439: see also 
Neuman, Suffrage, supra note 117, at 283. 
119. See infra notes 167-226 and accompanying text. 
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aliens. Aliens are exceptionally well protected in Germany because the 
Jedermann Grundrechte explicitly and implicitly provide many important 
protections for aliens120 and because German courts have generously 
interpreted and filled in the content of the law. 121 The Federal Constitutional 
Court has played an essential role in construing aliens' rights as analogous to 
the rights of Germans. In a famous 1978 decision, for example, the Court 
ruled that an alien acquires a constitutionally protected reliance interest to 
remain in Germany as a result of prior routine renewals of his residence 
permit and his integration into German society. 122 The Court has also held 
that long residence in Germany is a highly important factor in the calculus of 
rights due aliens,l23 especially in cases involving residence permits and work 
authorization. 124 As a result, the German/alien distinction matters functional-
ly in such circumscribed areas such as voting, complete freedom of 
association, freedom to choose any work place, and freedom to move 
anywhere in Germany. 125 
Yet even if the German/alien distinction is of limited functional signifi-
cance, its symbolic significance - the extent to which it shapes German 
thinking and political discourse about the relationship of Germans to others -
is enormous. 126 Moreover, this distinction must be read against the backdrop 
of the blood-based provisions of German citizenship and naturalization law, 
and the ethnic conception embodied in the Aussiedler provision of Article 
116(1) which, while clearly different from much of the Basic Law, has roots 
120. See supra notes 1l4-U5 and accompanying text. See also Michael Wollenschlager, Eirifiihrung 
in das Ausllindemcht, in EINW ANDERUNGSLANo BUNDESREPUBLlK DEUTSCHLAND? 19 (Gerhard Schult 
ed., 1982) [hereinafter EINWANDERUNGSLAND]. 
121. Indeed, German courts have been far more protective of aliens' rights than have U.S. courts, 
which tend to defer to the Executive branch on matters of immigration policy. See Gerald L. Neuman, 
Immigration and Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Gennany, 23 N.Y. U. J. lNT'L L. & POL. 35, 
47-75 (1990) (demonstrating that German Constitutional Court has exercised more oversight of 
immigration matters than United States Supreme Court) [hereinafter Neuman, Immigration]. 
122. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1978, 49 BVerfUE 168; see also Judgement of May 10, 1988, 78 
BVerfUE 179, 196-97. 
123. See Gunther Schwertfeger, Einwantierungsland Bundesrepublik? Tatsllchliche, politische und 
verjassungsrechtliche Grundierungen, in EINWANDERUNGSLAND, supra note 120, at 9, 14-16. 
124. Id. 
125. See supra notes 106-118 and accompanying text. Other consequences include lack of protection 
from extradition and loss of diplomatic protection. It is, however, important to note that the Basic Law's 
textual limitation of important rights to Germans leaves foreigners in a potentially vulnerable constitutional 
position; the plain language of the Basic Law offers less protection to non-citizens than do the more fluid 
interpretations of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
126. This point emerged at the November 1992 SPD emergency congress. Several speakers, including 
Mr. Bubis, suggested that legal reform of asylum and aliens' rights would not tackle the underlying 
foreigner problem unless more substantial measures were taken to ease and encourage naturalization by 
the roughly six million foreigners presently living in Germany. The party's deputy leader, Herta Daubler-
Gmelin, accused the governing Christian Democratic Union of concentrating on asylum.and opposing such 
reforms because they would threaten the CDU's interpretation of ·what was meant by a German.· See 
Judy Dempsey, Gennany Closer to Asylum Rejonns, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter 
Dempsey, Gennany Closer]. 
171 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 172 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
that extend back at least as far as nineteenth-century German conceptions of 
citizenship. 127 
So long as German constitutional law accepts any ethnic or racial criteria 
for automatic entry into the polity, it steers a path between two different 
ideals. On the one side, the constitutional definition of "German" is conceived 
partly in volkisch terms, a state of affairs that is exacerbated by a statutory 
law based exclusively on blood relations. On the other side is the Basic Law's 
firm commitment to fundamental human rights and basic notions of equality, 
ideals that the Constitutional Court vigorously oversees which tend to mitigate 
the potential harshness of being an alien. This dichotomy lies at the core of 
the current German immigration dilemma, and is reflected in the history and 
language of German citizenship laws. 
B. Statutory Origins of German Citizenship Law 
With the important exception of the Aussiedler provision of Article 116, 
the Basic Law does not define who is a German; this definition, as in most 
legal systems, is statutory. These German citizenship statutes most clearly 
reveal the distinctiveness of the current German debate on immigration. The 
story of modern German citizenship law can be traced at least as far back as 
the founding of the Reich in 1871. 128 German notions of citizenship and 
nationhood are different from those of most other nations because German 
national consciousness emerged long before the modern German political 
state, and therefore could not look primarily to political status as the defining 
characteristic of membership in the "nation." "[T]he German idea of the 
nation was not originally a political one, nor was it linked with the abstract 
idea of citizenship." 129 Instead, German notions of nationhood were, and 
remain, tied to the idea of a "cultural nation" in which the group may be 
defined by ethnicity. 130 
The fact that the late-emerging German nation-state has had a strongly 
federal nature through much of its history is also significant to German 
127. Commentators have noted that Article 116(1) was an exceptional, transitory provision of the 
Basic Law. Hans Alexy, Rechtsfragen des Aussiedlerzuzugs, 45 NEUE JURISTICHE WOCHANSCHRIFI' [NJW] 
2850. The Federal Constitutional Court also made clear early on that " [e) very constitutional provision must 
always be interpreted in such a way as to render it compatible with the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution." Judgment of Oct. 23, 1951, 1 BVerfGE 14, 32-33; see KOMMERS, CONSTrrurIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 93, at 52. This may not be possible where important rights tum on a 
distinction that may be based on ethnicity; the Court, however, has never explicitly addressed this concern. 
128. The roots of these issues lie much deeper in German history, see generally ROLF GRAWERT, 
SrMT UND SrMTSANGEHORIGKErr (1973), but this article limits its discussion to national statutory 
citizenship laws. 
129. Brubaker, supra note 32, at 8. 
130. Id.; see also Ulrich K. Preufi, Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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citizenship law. Thus, the first comprehensive citizenship law in Germany, the 
1870 "Statute Governing the Acquisition and Loss of Bund and State 
Membership" [RuStAG 1870],131 derived national citizenship132 and its 
loss directly from state (Bundesstaat) citizenship.133 As such, the nation did 
not control citizenship directly. 
The decisive change in German citizenship law occurred in 1913 when the 
1870 statute was comprehensively revised. 134 By that time, widespread 
dissatisfaction had arisen because the 1870 law provided that citizens could 
lose their citizenship as a result of long-term absence from Germany (the 
Auslandsdeutsche (Germans abroad) question) and because of large-scale 
immigration. Both explicit volldsch nationalism and a more ambiguous nascent 
patriotic nationalism fueled popular pressure to reform the law. 135 Volldsch 
nationalists, represented by organizations such as the Pan German League, 
emphasized "the preservation of Germandom abroad" and also argued strongly 
against the naturalization of so-called Volksjremde (foreigners to the people). 
Volldsch nationalists also emphasized the harm that the immigration of both 
ethnic and "cultural" foreigners would cause to Germany; however, their 
primary criterion for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable 
immigrants was racial. They expressly argued that only immigrants from 
Auslandsdeutsche and ethnic German communities abroad should be natural-
ized. 136 Patriotic nationalists, on the other hand, tended to cite the close ties 
many Auslandsdeutsche maintained with the Reich, and their continued 
importance to the Reich, as reasons for allowing transmission of citizenship 
to the descendants of Auslandsdeutsche.137 
131. Gesetz iiber die Erwerbung und den Verlust der Bundes und Staatsangehiirigkeit (des 
Norddeutschen Bundes) of June 1, 1870, BGB!. 355 [hereinafter RuStAG 1870]. The North-German Bund 
was a short-lived (1867-1871) confederation of German states that was the immediate predecessor of 
Bismarck's Reich. The RuStAG 1870 remained in effect after Bismarck founded the First Reich. See KAy 
HAll.BRONNER & GONTER RENNER, STAATSANGEHORlGKEITSREClIT 7-8 (1991). 
132. The term AngehiJrigkeit literally means "membership," but it is the functional equivalent in this 
setting of "citizenship." 
133. RuStAG 1870, supra note 131, § 1. The 1870 law also provided that legitimate children and 
recognized illegitimate children would achieve citizenship from their father under the jus sanguinis 
principle. Further, a foreign woman who married a German man could obtain German citizenship. Various 
naturalization provisions were also set forth, particularly relating to service to the Reich, community, 
schools, and certain religious organizations. ld. §§ 8, 9. 
134. Reichs-und Staatsangehiirigkeitsgesetz, July 22, 1913, RGBI. 583 [hereinafter RuStAG 1913]. 
This law introduced the use of the term "German" as a category broader than citizen. Section 1 of the new 
law stated: "a German is one who has citizenship in a federal state or who possesses direct imperial 
citizenship. " ld. § 1 ("Deutscher ist, wer die Staatsangehorigkeit in einem Bundestaat oder die unmittelbare 
Reichsangehorigkeit besitzt. ") (author's translation). Direct imperial citizenship might be granted to certain 
foreigners who lived in German colonies or to former Germans or their descendants living outside of 
Germany. ld. §§ 33-35. The latter provision is similar to GG art. 116, but admissions decisions under 
these provisions of the 1913 law were expressly discretionary. 
135. See Wll.LJAM ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSmP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 
115-17 (1992) [hereinafter, BRUBAKER, CITIZENSmP]. 
136. ld. at 116. 
137. ld. at 117. 
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The main question was whether to maintain the jus sanguinis138 model 
that, for the most part, had been the German norm, or to introduce elements 
of jus soli. The Social Democrats argued that persons born and raised in 
Germany were German in fact and should have the right to become German 
in law; therefore, they proposed that the law should provide for the 
naturalization of those born and residing in Germany. 139 This proposal and 
the ensuing debate centered solely on the principle of jus soli as ajustification 
for naturalization; there was no proposal or debate on the introduction of jus 
soli to grant automatic citizenship to any person born on German terri-
tory.14O Parliamentary debates prior to the revision focused on fundamental 
questions about the acquisition and loss of citizenship, and resembled those 
taking place in Germany today. 141 In the end, Germany adopted a strong, 
descent-based citizenship law designed largely to protect expatriates from 
losing their German citizenship.142 So long as an expatriate German neither 
naturalized to nor served in the military of his country of residence, he could 
maintain his German citizenship, and transmit it to his descendants, 
indefinitely.143 However, the revisions included no right to naturalization for 
non-Germans born on German soil. 
That this was the case is not surprising. From the founding of the German 
138. Jus sanguinis is the right of citizenship by blood; jus soli is the right of citizenship by birth 
within the territory of the state. Rolf Grawert has pointed out a number of factors that may have 
contributed to the German rejection of the jus soli: the desire to distance modern German society from 
what some perceived to be a feudal concept; distaste for the rigid territorial conscription policies of 
Napoleon; and the small size of the German principalities, the North-German Confederation's grant of 
reciprocal citizenship privileges, and the ease of movement and mobility had all tended to undercut the 
ancient idea of a natural tie to the land of one's birth. GRAWERT, supra note 128, at 190. 
139. BRUBAKER, CrnzENSHIP, supra note 135, at 136. 
140. ld. at 119-20. 
141. For a description of these debates and the parties' positions see Bertold Huber, Die BeraJung 
des Reichs - una StaatsangeMrigkeitsgesetzes von 1913 im Deurschen Reichstag. in AUFENTHALT-N-
IEDERLASSUNG-ElNBtlRGERUNG 181 (Klaus Barwig etal., eds. 1987). Among other things, a representative 
oftheDeursch-KonservativePartei (German Conservative Party), which generally supported the monarchy, 
Prussian Junkel:\'. and big business, also supported the jus sanguinis, arguing that it ·serves to preserve 
and protect German vtJlkisch character and German uniqueness.· 1d. at 188 (author's translation). On the 
other side, the left-liberal Fortschrittliche Volkspartei (progressive People's Party) argued in favor of the 
adoption of jus soli naturalization based on birth and residence in Germany. One representative from this 
party argued that, apart from Swiss Cantons and Austria, the idea of denying citizenship to those born and 
raised in a nation-state was not generally accepted; that the jus soli was not completely unknown in the 
German principalities and was, at least as regards naturalization, as much a part of German heritage as 
the jus sanguinis; and that many foreign workers in Germany should not be denied rights on purely ethnic 
or racial grounds since they were de facto Germans in all but race. 1d. 188-89. A representative of the 
Polish community also pointed out the injustices suffered as a result of Bismarck's deportation policies and 
argued in favor of the jus soli. ld. at 190. The representatives of the SPD, the radical ancestor oftoday's 
catch-all party, also supported a right to naturalization for foreigners born and raised in Germany. Id. at 
189-90. 
142. The 1913 law eased repatriation provisions for widows and divorced women who had lost their 
German citizenship due to marriage to a foreigner; it also removed or mitigated other expatriation 
provisions. See GERARD RElffi DE GROOT, STAATSANGEHORIGKElTSREClIT 1M WANDEL 5S (1989). 
143. BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 135, at 11+.19. 
174 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 175 1993
German Law of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship 
Empire in 1871, there had been significant, uncontrolled, unorganized 
immigration of workers, largely Poles from Russia and Austria-Hungary .144 
Thousands of agricultural workers entered the East and South, and industrial 
workers and miners came to the Ruhr region. By 1907, an estimated 800,000 
foreigners worked in Germany, comprising some four percent of the 
population. The 1910 census showed 1,259,880 foreign residents.14s These 
workers often lived isolated in accommodations that were overcrowded and 
"a breeding place for crime, disease and social problems. "146 In addition, 
they often worked harder, longer, and for less money than Germans. For all 
of these reasons, local German populations frequently feared and distrusted 
these foreign workers. 
These anti-foreigner sentiments had begun to have an effect on government 
policy in the early twentieth century. Already in 1899 the Royal Mining 
Office of Dortmund issued a decree that made command of the German 
language a prerequisite for senior positions.147 By 1907 government actions 
were more direct: in that year the government carried out several mass 
expulsions of Polish workers.148 It also forced other foreign workers to 
leave the country for part of every year to ensure that they could not qualify 
for permanent residency or citizenship.149 Other actions were predominantly 
cultural: laws in 1908 prohibited the use of Polish in public, and made 
German the official language of all organizations. 150 Against this back-
ground, it is not surprising that legislators rejected the naturalization 
proposals, arguing that they wanted to maintain the "ethno-cultural integrity" 
of the German nation-state. 151 
1. Citizenship Laws under National Socialism 
No other significant changes were made to the German citizenship statute 
until the Nazi government completely reformed Germany's citizenship laws. 
Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf: 
144. STEPHEN CASTLES & GonULA KOSACK, IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND CLASS STRUGGLE IN 
WESTERN EUROPE 19-20 (1973); RAy C. RIsT, GUESTWORKERS IN GERMANY: THE PROSPECfS FOR 
PLURALISM 58-60 (1978). 
'145. RIsT, supra note 144, at 58. 
146. CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 144, at 19. 
147. Bergpolizeiverordnung des Kiiniglichen Oberbergarntes Dortmund, noted in Hartrnut Esser & 
Herman Korte, Federal Republic oj Germany, in EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POllCY: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 165, 167 (Tomas Hammar ed., 1985). 
148. RIsT, supra note 144, at 58. 
149. rd. This was the Karenzzeit (waiting period) from November 15 to Aprill. Once the First World 
War began this changed; during the war, Polish workers were forbidden from leaving Germany. As soon 
as the Poles (some 700,000) crossed the border they lost both the right to leave and the right to change 
employment in Germany. Esser & Korte, supra note 147, at 167-68. 
150. rd. at 167. 
151. Brubaker, supra note 135, at 124-35. 
175 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 176 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
It is hardly imaginable that anyone should think that a German could be made out 
of, say, a Negro or a Chinaman, because he has learned German and is ready to 
talk it for the rest of his life, and to vote for some German political party. The 
process would mean a beginning of bastardization of our race . . . . Since 
nationality, or rather race, is not a matter of language, but of blood, it would be 
possible to talk about Germanization only if the process could alter the nature of 
the blood of the person subjected to it .... Whenever foreign blood has been 
introduced into the body of a nation, its unhappy effect has been to break up our 
national character. IS2 
The relationship between citizenship and National Socialist ideology is 
obvious.1s3 In his famous work Staat, Bewegung, Volk (State, Movement, 
People), Carl Schmitt asserted that state power comes directly from das Volk 
(defined by racial characteristics) and that the Nazi Party was the embodiment 
of das Volk. For Schmitt, the political status of membership could only be 
based on race. As Schmitt wrote, "[t]he racial similarity of the united German 
people. . . is, therefore, the indispensable precondition and foundation for the 
concept of the political leadership of the German people."IS4 Nazi writers 
traced this view of citizenship linking race, community, and state power back 
within German cultural history. The leading Nazi commentary on the Nazi 
citizenship laws discussed them as an outgrowth of "Germanic" thought. ISS 
In Germanic thought, it was argued, community - meaning family, clan, or 
Volk - subsumed an individual's entire life. In this view, the Reich or state 
was merely "the exterior structure of the law in which the ordered community 
of the Germans assumes an external appearance. It is the legal concept of 
German political unity. "IS6 Reich citizenship "actualizes the Volkish ordering 
of the German people on the political level. IIIS7 
Pursuant to this philosophy, the Nazis overturned Germany's federalist 
structure and replaced it with a centralized legal system. ISS In 1934, they 
amended the 1913 Citizenship Law (RuStAG) by decree to include a flrst 
section declaring that "[t]here is only one German Citizenship (Reich 
Citizenship)."ls9 The next year, this new legal framework was modifled to 
include two levels of German citizens: Reich citizens and state citizens 
(Reichsbarger and Staatsangehonge). Only Germans or those of other 
152. ADoLF HITLER, My BATI'LE 158 (The Riverside Press, 1933). 
153. In this context it is ironic that the attempt to deport Hitler to Austria after his 1923 putsch failed 
because deference was given to the fact that Hitler thought of himself as German. PETER GAY, WEIMAR 
CULTURE 21 (1968). 
154. CARL SCHMrIT, STAAT, BEWEGUNG, VOLK 42 (1933) (author's translation); see generally 
GEORGE L. MOSSE, NAZI CULTURE 326 (1981). 
155. See Wilhelm Stuckart & Hans Globke, Civil Rights and the Natural Inequality of Man, in 
MOSSE, supra note 154, at 328. 
156. Id. at 329. 
157. Id. at 33l. 
158. Gesetz iiber den Neuautbau, Jan. 30, 1934, RGBI. 175, reprinted in Uwa BRODERSEN & INGO 
VON MONcH, GESETZE DES NS-STAATES: DOKUMENTE EINES UNRECHTSSYSTEMS 48 (1982). 
159. Verordnung iiber die deutsche Staatsangehorigkeit, of 1934, RGBl. I 85, § l. 
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"Aryan" blood could be Reich citizens, and only Reich citizens would enjoy 
full rights. 160 
The Nazi citizenship laws had a number of distinct effects. First, they 
legitimized and concretized racially-based distinctions by linking them to legal 
structures. Second, they enhanced tremendously the importance of the federal 
government by making national citizenship, rather than state citizenship, the 
highest possible legal status. In so doing, the laws expanded the power of the 
federal government by leaving determinations of citizenship in the hands of 
federal government operatives. 161 
2. The Post-War Era 
After the collapse of the Nazi regime the Basic Law ushered in a new era 
in German legal culture. However, this new era did not include a fundamental 
revision of the citizenship laws; the 1913 statute was simply put back into 
effect. Thus the basic features of German citizenship law - fIrst standardized 
under Kaiser Wilhelm II - survived Bismarck, Weimar, and Hitler, and were 
ultimately accepted by both West162 and East Germany with little modifIca-
tion.163 For virtually all non-discretionary claims to birth-right citizenship, 
Germany continues to rely exclusively on the jus sanguinis, as it has since 
1913. Ascriptive citizenship is granted only to the children, including adopted 
children, of a German parent. 164 
Kay Hailbronner and others have long argued that the Federal Republic 
did not create a new citizenship law because West Germany did not wish to 
destroy the fiction that a unifIed Reich continued to exist. 165 According to 
this view, alteration of the citizenship law would have implicitly rejected the 
goal of reunifIcation required by the Preamble of the Basic Law. In recent 
years, however, and especially since reunifIcation, Hailbronner has suggested 
other justifIcations for the maintenance of the old law. Hailbronner offers an 
explicit ethnic and cultural argument that betrays an uneasy historical 
resonance: "German citizenship law has deep historical roots. The German 
idea of nationhood is basically not a political one but a cultural, linguistic and 
160. Reichsbiirgergesetz, Sept. 15, 1935, RGBI. I 1146. 
161. See generally MOSSE, supra note 154, at 320-30. 
162. HAll.BRONNER & RENNER, supra note 131, at 8-20. But see Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen 
der Staatsangehorigkeit, Feb. 22, 1955, BGBI. 165 (dealing with problems caused by border changes from 
1938 to 1945); Zweites Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der StaatsangehOrigkeit, May 17, 1956, BGBI. 
1431 (dealing with problems caused by 1938 Anschluss). 
163. See, e.g., Staatsbiirgerschaftsgesetz, Feb. 20, 1967, GBI. I, §§ 4-8; Gesetz zur Anderung des 
Staatsbiirgerschaftsgesetz, Jan. 29, 1990, GBI. I. See generally ECKART KLEIN ET AL., BORGER UND 
STAAT, EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCmJNG ZU PRAxrs UND REClIT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND UND DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REpUBLIK (1990). 
164. RuStAG 1913, supra note 134 § 3. 
165. HAll.BRONNER, supra note 37, at 67. 
177 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 178 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
ethnic one. This traditional ethno-cultural conception of nationhood remains 
alive today. "166 This approach to citizenship reflects a specific attitude 
towards the character of the German state and German society. It is also 
central to the approach Germany has taken to naturalization law. 
C. Naturalization 
Naturalization is the ceremonial legal process by which foreigners are 
admitted into the polity as full members. While blood and territory have 
always been the primary determinants of ascriptive citizenship laws, ideas of 
merit or value generally play the most important role in naturalization 
laws.167 Modern naturalization laws do more than simply "invite" outsiders 
into the "imagined community."168 Since they almost invariably involve 
amorphous, value-based standards, in contrast to the bright line, automatic 
rules of jus soli and jus sanguinis ascriptive citizenship, naturalization laws 
may also more accurately reflect underlying societal values. 
Naturalization is discretionary in two ways. First, decisions are made by 
officials who are empowered to decide whether potential citizens have met 
legal standards. Second, an individual often has no right to naturalize, even 
if he satisfies all legal criteria. 
The Basic Law resolved the question of relative state and federal authority 
in the realm of naturalization by granting the states the initial authority to 
process applications; as such, both the state and federal governments set 
naturalization policy in Germany. 169 As with ascriptive citizenship, the most 
important legal source on naturalization is the RuStAG 1913, as amended. 170 
It remained largely unchanged, except for the period of National Social-
ism.171 The statute provides that: 
166. ld. at 74. 
167. The roots of naturalization may be seen in ·totemic· ceremonies that are clearly related to 
religious conversion practices. Political theorists have long recognized the importance of naturalization. 
In the Laws, for example, Plato describes one of the earliest value-based naturalization policies - for his 
proposed colony of Magnesia. Plato reql'ired that ·[t]he citizens who are to form the new Magnesian 
colony are to be drawn from various quarters, and they must be carefully tested (like streams flowing into 
a reservoir) before being admitted.· PLATO, LAWS 352-53 (R.G. Bury trans., 1926). Plato did not provide 
ascriptive citizenship rules, based on consanguinity or territorial right, in part because he was primarily 
concerned with community formation, rather than continuity. He seemed, however, to envision a 
continuing process of assimilation based on values: 
for we shall test thoroughly by every kind of test and by length of time the vicious among those 
who attempt to enter our present State as citizens, and so prevent their arrival, whereas we shall 
welcome the virtuous with all possible graciousness and goodwill. 
ld. at 353. 
168. ANDERSON, supra note 90, at 145. 
169. GG arts. 123(1), 124, 73(2), 83. 
170. Sections 8 and 9 are the main provisions dealing with naturalization. RuStAG 1913, supra note 
134, §§ 8, 9. 
171. See, e.g., Reichsbiirgergesetz, Sept. 15, 1935, RGB1. I 1146. 
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[A] foreigner who has settled in German territory (im Inland) can, upon 
application, be naturalized by the state in whose territory he has settled, if he or 
she: 
1. has an unlimited right to engage in employment, business and contract according 
to the laws of the former homeland or under German law (unbeschrlinkt 
gescJu2ji~hig), 
2. has lived a "clean life" (unbescholtenen Lebenswandel geftlhrt hat) 
3. has obtained housing, 
4. has the ability to support himfherself and the family.172 
Section 8 delegates discretionary authority to the executive branches of the 
state governments. 173 Over the years decisions of the Federal Administrative 
Court and federal regulations issued by the Minister for Domestic Affairs174 
have developed particular naturalization rules that supersede state discre-
tion. 175 The federal regulations fill in statutory gaps and set out additional 
requirements. Moreover, they set the general policy guidelines for and general 
characteristics of all German naturalization practice. 176 
Despite the importance of guidelines such as these, traditional German 
legal theory held that administrative rules were not legally binding. Modern 
legal theory, however, accepts that at least some administrative rules are as 
binding as statutes.171 The naturalization guidelines are "discretion guide-
lines" (verhaltenslenkende Verwaltungsvorschriften or Ennessensrichtlinien) 
that try to standardize the exercise of administrative discretion by providing 
fixed criteria and examples. The guidelines bind the officers and agencies to 
whom they are issued. 178 As such, the guidelines bind courts reviewing 
administrative discretion for error. Thus, even if the guidelines do not confer 
upon individuals a right to naturalize, they do create a presumption that the 
government has bound itself by self-imposed rules,179 and individuals can 
challenge the government's failure to follow the administrative regulations 
absent convincing reasons. 
The most basic element of the federal naturalization policies contained in 
the regulations is that "Germany is not a country of immigration; she does not 
aspire intentionally to increase the number of German citizens through 
172. RuStAG 1913, supra note 134, § 8. 
173. [d. 
174. Einbiirgerungsrichtlinie, Dec. 15, 1977, 1978 GMS!. 16, reprinted in ALExANDER N. MAKAROV 
& HANS VON MANGOLDT, DEUTSCHES STAATSANGEHORIGKElTSREClIT (3d ed., 1981, 9th installment, 
1987) [hereinafter Naturalization Guidelines]. 
175. MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 174, at RuStAG § 8, cmt. 57. 
176. Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 1. 
177. On administrative rules in general, see Fritz Ossenbiihl, Die Quellen des Verwaltungrechts, in 
HANS-UWE ERICHSEN & WOLFGANG MARTENS, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSREClIT 89, 89-101 (8th ed., 
1988); HARTMUT MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSREClIT § 24 (7th ed., 1990). The main 
difference between the binding force of statutes and administrative rules is that rules allow deviations, 
while statutes have to be administered more strictly. ERICHSEN & MARTENS, supra, § 7(1V)(4), at 94. 
178. MAURER, supra note 177, § 24(3). 
179. This is the Theorie der Selbstbindung der Verwaltung. ERICHSEN & MARTENS, supra note 177, 
§ 7(1V)(4), at 94. 
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naturalization."180 In addition, naturalization is not a matter of individual 
right, but one of societal interest to be determined by executive 
decision-makers. The states can only grant German citizenship if doing so is 
in the "public interest"; the personal wishes and economic interests of the 
applicant are of secondary importance. 181 
Applicants must demonstrate "a free-willed and lasting commitment to 
Germany, a basic understanding of our public order and an acknowledgement 
of the basic order of our free democratic society. ,,182 Applicants should 
normally have a command of written and spoken German appropriate to their 
situation.183 Most applicants must have lived in Germany for ten years. 184 
The regulations also specify that the statutory "clean life" requirement can be 
applied to exclude applicants with criminal records, as well as alcoholics, 
those who fail to support children, and those unwilling to work. 185 
Two requirements in particular create enormous disincentives for 
foreigners who might otherwise seek to obtain German citizenship. Regulation 
4 states a policy against establishing different citizenships within families. The 
ostensible reason for this policy is that "[d]ifferent citizenship within a family, 
especially if they live together, brings the danger of legal uncertainty in 
international private law and of conflicts between family ties and duties to the 
state. "186 This policy facilitates the naturalization of German citizens' 
relatives who agree to give up their former citizenship. However, the policy 
hinders the naturalization of applicants who are the children or grandchildren 
of foreigners. The regulations exempt former Germans, Expellees, people 
granted asylum, and certain refugees and stateless persons from this policy; 
otherwise, an applicant must present "an important reason" for a waiver.187 
The second major disincentive is the policy against multiple nationali-
ty.188 As with the intra-family policy, the possession of dual or multiple 
nationality by an individual is said to bring "the danger of legal uncertainty, 
especially in private international law . . . and conflicting duties to different 
legal orders. "189 The regulation also notes that Germany is party to the 
Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality of May 6, 
180. Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 2.3. 
181. ld. § 2.2. 
182. ld. § 3.1. 
183. ld. § 3.1.1. This may be waived for the elderly. 
184. ld. § 3.2. Spouses of Germans, German veterans, former Germans, ethnic Germans, and some 
minor children are subject to shorter requirements. The period can be waived in exceptional cases when 
required by the public interests.ld. § 3.2.3. Moreover, the 10-year requirement no longer applies to some 
second and later generation foreigners. See infra notes 223-225 and accompanying text. 
185. Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 3.3. 
186. ld. § 4.1 
187. ld. §§ 4.2, 4.3. 
188. ld. § 5.3. 
189. ld. § 5.3.1. 
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1963,190 and argues that the Convention requires it to adopt this policy 
discouraging dual nationality. 191 Other signatory states, however, have 
adopted far less restrictive practices. l92 
A number of exceptions mitigate the effects of the dual citizenship 
prohibition. These include waivers for applicants who have had most of their 
schooling in Germany, and for those who have reached the age of military 
service and whose home country will not allow them to renounce their 
previous citizenship without having served in the army. 193 Exceptions to the' 
policy may also be made for extreme hardship.194 The policy against 
multiple nationality may be waived for people granted asylum, for refugees 
who have been formally taken under German protection, and for 
VolkszugehOrige. 195 
Restrictions on dual citizenship are a major reason why German 
naturalization rates are low.196 Many foreigners do not apply for naturaliza-
tion because they do not wish to give up all ties to their former homeland. 
The various waivers do make most second-generation Turks and Greeks 
eligible for naturalization. Nevertheless, those groups continue to naturalize 
at low rates. It would thus appear that additional factors impede the 
naturalization of these groups. 
Judicial construction of the naturalization statutes and regulations has 
upheld and strengthened the substantial discretion belonging to government 
decision-makers. Moreover, in 1983, the highest German Federal Administra-
tive Court held that if there is any doubt about an applicant's commitment to 
Germany's free democratic constitution, a case can be denied. 197 Courts have 
held that the government is not required to balance the interests of an 
applicant against those of the state; the government need only consider the 
interests of the state. 198 The authorities are not required to grant a natural-
190. Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in 
Cases of Multiple Nationality, May 6, 1963, 634 U.N.T.S. 221; 36 Vertriige der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland A 483, ratified by Gesetz zu dem Ubereinkommen vom 6. Mai 1963 iiber die Verringerung 
der Mehrstaatigkeit und iiber die Wehrpflicht von Mehrstaatern of September 29, 1969, BGBI. II 1953. 
191. See Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 5.3.1. 
192. See infra notes 205-217 and accompanying text. 
193. Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 5.3.3.6; see also Brubaker, supra note 32, at 116. 
194. Naturalization Guidelines, supra note 174, § 5.3.3. 
195. ld. § 5.3.3.3. Special provisions are also made for elderly applicants, minor children, those of 
military age, and those who have been outside their homeland for at least 20 years, have lived 10 years 
in Germany and are over 40 years old. ld. § 5.3.3.4 through § 5.3.3.7. Fina\Iy, exceptions can be made 
in the public interest, ld. § 5.3.4, and for certain spouses of Germans and those who have lost German 
citizenship due to marriage with a foreigner. ld. § 5.3.5. 
196. Brubaker, supra note 32, at 115. 
197. Judgment of June 27, 1983 (BVerwGE), reprinted in 4 SAMMEL-UNO NACHSCHLAGEWERK DER 
RECHfSPRECHUNG DES BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHfS § 1, at 23 (Karl Buchholz et aI., eds.); Judgment 
of Aug. 24, 1979 (BVerwGE), reprinted in 3 SAMMEL-UNO NACHSCHLAGEWERK DER BUNOESVER-
WALTUNGSGERICHfS § 1, at 6 (Karl Buchholz et al., eds.). 
198. See, e.g., Judgment of Sept. 30, 1958, 7 BVerwGE 237 ("Accordingly, it is not a matter of a 
balancing of the interests of the individual with the interests of the receiving state. The interests of the state 
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ization request if "on political, cultural, or economic grounds, they come to 
the conclusion that the naturalization is not in the interests of the state. "199 
By contrast, although U.S. law contains similar threshold criteria of "good 
moral character" and "attachment to constitutional principles, "200 the 
applicant who satisfies these requirements is not subject to a discretionary 
denial based on a political or bureaucratic evaluation of the "interests of the 
state." In Germany, however, the discretionary aspect of Section 8 serves 
primarily to facilitate a flexible naturalization policy which responds to current 
state requirements and population policy. 201 Multilateral conventions such 
as the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention202 limit this rather broad discretion 
somewhat203 as does Article 6 of the Basic Law, which guarantees special 
protection for the family.204 Despite these restrictions, however, the 
naturalization system remains highly discretionary. 
Though it is difficult to separate legal factors from political and cultural 
factors, the German naturalization laws clearly have played a role in 
maintaining one of Europe's lowest naturalization rates. According to a 1986 
study, naturalization rates in Germany were substantially lower than those of 
France, Sweden, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.205 Thus, 
although Sweden has an ascriptive jus sanguinis system not unlike that of 
Germany, Sweden naturalizes approximately 5.1 % of the population that is 
eligible to apply per year.206 By contrast, Germany naturalizes only about 
0.3 % of the people eligible to apply per year. 207 
A brief survey of neighboring European countries illuminates some of the 
differences from the German approach. Although many states rely primarily 
on the jus sanguinis notion of citizenship, virtually all mitigate its potential 
exclusivity with a qualified right to naturalize. For example, Belgium's 1984 
revision of its citizenship laws208 grants children born in Belgium the right 
to naturalize.209 Even if neither parent was born in Belgium, a child born 
and raised on Belgian soil can choose Belgian citizenship between the ages of 
have to be taken into consideration in every case of naturalization. "). 
199. Hans Dieter Rauscher, Deutsches StaatsangeMrigkeitsrecht - GesetzIiche Gnllldiagen z/lld 
RechtsprechWlg zur EinbOrgenmg, in BARWIG ET AL., supra note 141, at 134. 
200. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1988). 
201. MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 174, at § 8 RuStAG, cmt. 7 (author's translation). 
202. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened/or signature July 28, 1951, 8 U.S.T. 
6260; T.I.A.S. No. 6577; 189 U.N.T.S. 137. . 
203. See, e.g., Judgment of Aug. 18, 1981, 64 BVerwGE 29. 
204. Spousal applications under Section 9 of the RuStAG will only be denied after a showing of 
"considerable" state interests. Here, influenced by Article 6, the courts have required a more particularized 
balancing process. See Judgment of May 7, 1983, 67 BVerwGE 177. 
205. Brubaker, supra note 32, at 118. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. See generally MICHEL VERWILGHEN, LA CODE DE LA NATIONALrr~ BELGE: LOI Du 28 JUIN 
1984 (1985). 
209. LA CODE DE LA NATION~ BELGE, arts. 10, 11. 
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eighteen and twenty-two.210 
France relies on what amounts to a hybrid jus sanguinis/jus soli system. 
Children of two French parents are French. If only one parent is French, the 
child has a right to naturalize at age eighteen.211 A French-born child of 
foreign parents receives French citizenship if one parent was born in 
France.212 Like the new German law, the French Code also provides that 
a French-born child of foreign-born parents can obtain French citizenship at 
majority if she has lived in France for at least five years before applica-
tion. Unlike the German law, however, this right is virtually automatic.213 
Indeed, since 1977, some 75,000 persons have been naturalized in France 
each year. 214 
Austria's naturalization system is most similar to Germany's. Indeed, 
following the 1990 German revisions, Austrian law is more restrictive than 
German law. Austrian statutory law relies almost exclusively on the jus 
sanguinis principle.215 Naturalization may be granted at the discretion of the 
government to applicants who have at least ten years of residence216 • People 
born and raised in Austria do not have the right to naturalize, but the statute 
grants applicants who accrue thirty years of residence in Austria and meet 
other conditions the right to naturalize.217 
In 1990, as part of a comprehensive revision of the Aliens Law, 218 
important changes were made to the German naturalization laws. The Federal 
Government "deem[ed] it necessary to appeal to those aliens who have been 
resident . . . for many years and who wish to stay. . . permanently to apply 
for German citizenship. ,,219 The new law provides that foreigners who have 
resided in Germany for eight years, are between the ages of sixteen and 
twenty-three, have attended school in Germany for six years (at least four of 
which must be in a school of general education), have no serious criminal 
record, and who relinquish their former citizenship should be naturalized; this 
law trumps all other regulations. 220 Exceptions to the renunciation of 
210. ld. art. 14. 
211. C. elV. art. 21(17). 
212. C. elV. art. 21(23). 
213. C. elV. art. 21(44). This right may be denied under unusual circumstances if the government 
can demonstrate "lack of assimilation" or a significant defect in the applicant's past (indignit€). 
214. See Rainer Hotinann, Einbiirgerungspraxis und-probleme ausgewiihlter Staaten und die jeweiJige 
Anwendung des Ubereinkommens iiber die Verringerung der Mehrstaatigkeit6 (1989) (unpublished paper, 
on file with author). 
215. Bundesgesetz fiber die Osterreichische Staatsbiirgerschaft, July 15, 1965 BGBI. 1171 (Aus.). 
216. ld. § 10(1)(1). 
217. ld. § 12. 
218. See infra notes 286-300 and accompanying text. 
219. Statement of Legislative Intent Accompanying the Bill for the Revision of the Aliens Law 
(English translation distributed by Federal Interior Ministry, June 1990), at 21 (on file with author). 
220. Gesetz iiber die Einreise und den Aufenthalt von AusHindern im Bundesgebiet (AusHindergesetz), 
July 9, 1990, BGBI. I 1354, §§ 85 et seq. [hereinafter 1990 AuslGl. 
183 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 184 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
citizenship can be made for persons whose home country will not allow 
renunciation, or who would face particular hardship or persecution if they 
were to renounce their former citizenship. 221 In addition, the law also 
provides that aliens who have lived in Germany for fifteen years and who 
apply before December 31, 1995 may be naturalized if they have no serious 
criminal record, can support themselves and their families, and relinquish 
their former citizenship.222 The fee for this special naturalization has been 
reduced to 100 marks.223 
These provisions mark a substantial change from Germany's restrictive 
naturalization history. However, they do not constitute a right to naturalize in 
any sense. The statute uses the phrase "as a rule" to describe the basic 
standard; thus, the new naturalization standard lies somewhere between the 
unfettered discretion of pre-1990 naturalization practice and ethnic Germans' 
right to citizenship. Still, although the 1990 revisions moved Germany closer 
to the mainstream of European citizenship and naturalization practice, they did 
not alter those fundamental aspects of German naturalization that serve to keep 
applications low. These include the exclusive reliance on the jus sanguinis 
principle for ascriptive citizenship, the generally discretionary nature of the 
system, and the requirement to relinquish foreign citizenship in many cases. 
Taken together, these elements dissuade people from seeking citizenship while 
erecting barriers against anyone who tries.224 The various waivers do, 
however, make most second-generation Turks and Greeks eligible for 
naturalization. 225 
The current political and social climate undoubtedly still discourages 
foreigners in Germany from attempting to naturalize. As William Brubaker 
notes: 
The barriers to naturalization lie not only in the restrictiveness of legal provisions 
but equally in the political culture of naturalization, embodied in attitudes of 
Germans and immigrants alike. Without a changed understanding of what it is to 
be - or to become - German, the liberalization of naturalization policy will not 
produce a dramatic surge in naturalization.226 
Ironically, the liberal legal protections granted to foreigners in Germany 
have also deterred naturalization. As noted above, foreigners in Germany are 
entitled to wide-ranging social benefits and receive important legal protections. 
221. ld. § 87. 
222. ld. § 86. Aliens for whom it is absolutely impossible to relinquish citizenship may be excused. 
ld. § 87. 
223. ld. § 90. 
224. Not all commentators agree with this assessment. Hailbronner, for example, argues that most 
foreigners decline to naturalize because the advantages of German citizenship over residency are not so 
great, and because the foreigners wish to return to their countries of origin. Hailbronner, supra note 37, 
at 67,76. 
225. CITIzENSHIP IN EUROPE, supra note 32, at 116. 
226. BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP, supra note 135, at 79. 
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Citizenship is thus not nearly as important to the day-to-day life of a foreigner 
in Germany as it might be elsewhere. 
D. Post-War Provisions for Ethnic Germans 
The Basic Law largely leaves the definition of who is a German to statute. 
Articles 73(2) and 124 simply provide that substantive citizenship questions 
are within the federal government's competence.227 Article 116, however, 
contains a specific provision that has become important to the foreigner 
debate: in addition to German citizens, a German is a person who "has been 
admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the frontiers of 
December 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German stock 
(Vo!kszugehlJriger) or as the spouse or descendant of such person."22g 
Some commentators note that the word VolkszugehlJrige was used in a 
1939 Nazi citizenship decree.229 Thus Article 116(1), the primary source of 
rights for the Aussiedler, uses a phrase that some believe to be evocative of 
Nazi views of ethnicity and blood.230 As such, it is important to ask whether 
Article 116 expresses a vlJlkisch ideal or a transitory, pragmatic, humanitarian 
response to a unique problem. 
Article 116(1) contains a number of legal ambiguities that have been 
resolved through statutory law and judicial interpretation. The fIrst and most 
important statute was the 1953 Federal Expellee Law,231 which replaced a 
number of separate state laws and which controls many aspects of the 
acceptance of potential Aussiedler into Germany. The most important statutory 
change concerned the very definition of "expellees" (Vertriebene).232 The 
Federal Expellee Law fIrst defines Vertriebene as persons who were forced 
to give up their residence in German communities between 1943 and 1949 
227. See HANSJORG JELLINEK, ENTWICKLUNGSTENDENZEN UNO PROBLEME DES DEUfSCHEN 
SrAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHTS 9-10 (1986). 
228. GG art. 116(1). In addition to this provision, Article 116(2) grants rights to the victims of Nazi 
policies: 
Former German citizens who, between 30 January 1933 and 8 May 1945, were deprived of their 
citizenship on political, racial or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall be regranted 
German citizenship on application. They shall be considered as not having been deprived of their 
German citizenship where they have established their domicile in Germany after 8 May 1945 
and have not expressed a contrary intention. 
Note that these probably non-ethnic Germans must clear an additional hurdle - they must not have 
expressed a "contrary intention." 
229. Alexy, supra note 127, at 2857. 
230. ld. At the SPD's emergency congress in November 1992, Ignatz Bubis, a leader of Germany's 
Jewish community, made this argument on the basis that German law continues to grant citizenship along 
blood lines. See Dempsey, Gemumy Closer, supra note 126, at 2. 
231. BVFG, supra note 75. The BVFG has been amended many times: a major revision was passed 
on Sept. 3, 1971, BGB!. I 1565; the most recent passed on Dec. 20, 1991, BGB!. 12317. See also 1990 
AAG, supra note 86. 
232. See HAOnER ET A'L., supra note 68, at 3. 
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because of the common measures taken against Germans after the war. This 
is clearly the group for whom Article 116(1) was crafted.233 The statute 
goes on to recognize a group who have "experienced a comparable fate up to 
the present" (Auchvertriebene or "also-expellees") and to list a number of 
specific areas from which they may come.234 
Since the BVFG derives from Article 116, the acceptance into Germany 
of all Expellees is not discretionary in the strong sense discussed above.235 
The interests of the state do not trump those of an applicant under the BVFG 
as they do those of an applicant for naturalization. As one German commenta-
tor has put it: "[t]he acceptance of an expellee ... can basically not be denied 
by the administrative authority. These persons thus possess in this regard a 
constitutional right to be admitted into Germany. "236 Some commentators 
believe that the main purpose of the Aussiedler system was "to facilitate the 
admission into Germany of Germans who lived under communism. "237 
The judiciary has also played a role in the evolution of this body of law. 
The Federal Constitutional Court has held that an "expellee" can also be 
"whoever during the time of the common expulsion measures was not 
physically present but still had his residence there and could not return 
without facing measures taken against him because he was a German 
Volkszugehoriger. "238 This reasoning applies to virtually any German 
VolkszugehOriger who lived in an affected area at the relevant time. Similarly, 
an Expellee could be a person who left an affected region even before the 
war, even if he left for other reasons.239 Moreover, Aussiedler generally 
have not been strictly compelled to prove that their flight was solely due to 
their status as German VolkszugehOrige.240 One leading German commentary 
has summed up the German case law relating to expellees and Aussiedler as 
follows: 
This case law . . . produces a uniform picture of legal expellee status: . . . neither 
by the original flight or expulsion . . . nor the giving up of residence, nor loss of 
homeland through failing to return because of fear of political persecution to a 
233. See MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 174, Anhang 2, at 4. 
234. The most important categories, apart from the Aussied/er, are (1) whoever, as a German citizen 
or VolkszugehlJriger, has lost his residence in the currently occupied German eastern territories or in the 
regions outside the German borders after December 31, 1937 as a result of the Second World War; and 
(2) whoever, as German citizen or VolkszugehlJriger, after January 30, 1933 took up residence outside the 
German Reich because of political opposition to National Socialism or threats or actions taken on account 
of race, religion, or world view. BFVG, supra note 75, § 1. 
235. While Expellees have the right to enter Germany, they may not enjoy full constitutional rights 
to travel within Germany. See infra note 245 and accompanying text. 
236. HA'O'SER ET AL., supra note 68, at 3. 
237. See Alexy, supra note 127, at 2855. 
238. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1964, 17 BVerfG 224. 
239. See Judgment of Apr. 26, 1967,26 BVerwGE 352 (plaintiff, born in Austria-Hungary and of 
Polish nationality in 1939, entitled to Expellee status in 1967 despite fact that he left Poland on business 
trip and had U.S. citizenship in 1967). 
240. Judgment of Apr. 26,1967,26 BVerwGE 352,358. 
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region where Germans were later expelled nor in the case of Aussiedler . . . does 
it depend upon whether reasons other than German VolkszugehOrigkeit (etbnicity) 
were ultimately determinative in the loss of his homeland. It is enough that he 
came from the described regions and that he is a German VolkszugehOriger. 241 
The Courts have also grappled with the question' of how one determines 
who is a VolkszugehiJriger. In 1981, the highest Federal Administrative Court, 
following a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, held that even a 
person who did not consider himself to be a Vo!kszugehiJriger (e.g., a Jew) 
could possibly be recognized as one under the BVFG.242 However, such 
applicants, especially Jewish ones, would face significant problems. For 
example, they would have to prove that others identified them, their parents, 
or their grandparents as German VolkszugehiJrige from before the beginning 
of the common expulsion measll!es. For Jews who lived in multi-ethnic 
societies like Romania, where they are and were primarily identified as Jews, 
not Germans, this could be difficult. 243 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to undertake a detailed analysis 
of the Federal Expellees Law (BVFG) , it is important to consider the 
relationship between the terms "German" (within the meaning of the Basic 
Law) and "citizen" (StaatsangehiJriger). As noted, an ethnic German who has 
been accepted as an Expellee/Aussiedler is a German under Basic Law Article 
116(1). To differentiate such persons from de jure citizens, German 
commentators refer to the Aussiedler as status Deutsche (status Germans). 
They are not treated as foreigners under the Aliens Laws, need no special 
residence permits, are free to work and travel, and in general have most of 
the rights of citizens, including the right to a passport and the right to 
vote.244 They have a right to free movement under Article 11 of the Basic 
Law, although this right may be limited by the Llinder.24S The BVFG itself 
also grants rights to housini46 and social help.247 Germany considers 
status-Germans to have the same rights as citizens vis-a-vis third countries, 
241. MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 174, GG art. 116 cmt. 19, at 14. 
242. Judgment of Dec. 16, 1981, 59 BVerfGE 128; see also Judgment of Sept. 27, 1982, 66 
BVerwGE 168 (regarding constitutional requirements for nationality of non-resident ethnic Germans). The 
Court stated "religious affiliation is neutral with respect to membership in the Volk." 59 BVerfGE at 
154-55. 
243. See 59 BVerfGE at 155. 
244. HA'08ER ET AL., supra note 68, at 17. Status-Germans do not, however, receive the protections 
of GG art. 16(1) against the deprivation of citizenship. Id. at 9. The categories of German citizen and 
status-German under Article 116 are mutually exclusive, and while it is possible for a status-German to 
naturalize and become a full citizen, a status-German who obtains and then for some reason relinquishes 
German citizenship does not revert to Article 116 status. MAKAROV & VON MANGOLDT, supra note 174, 
GG art. 116 cmt.6. 
245. See, e.g., Gesetz iiber die Festlegung eines vorIaufigen Wohnortes fUr Aus- und Ubersiedler, 
July 6, 1989, BGBI. I 1378 (empowering Lllnder temporarily to regulate place of residence of new 
Aussiedler and 'Obersiedler.). 
246. BVFG, supra, note 75, § 80. 
247. Id. §§ 90, 91. 
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and they are entitled to full German diplomatic protection. They are also 
entitled to protection against extradition under Article 16(2)(1) of the Basic 
Law. 
In the past few years, new restrictions have been placed on benefits for 
Aussiedler. Since January 1, 1990, for example, Aussiedler are no longer 
entitled to full unemployment benefits, but get monetary help (Eingliederungs-
geld) for twelve months after entry, as well as language courses for a ten-
month period.248 Also, since mid-1990, potential Aussiedler must be in 
possession of a special permit to enter Germany. 249 As a result, most 
applicants must now pursue their applications from abroad. These restrictions 
may reflect a hardening of attitudes towards the Aussiedler in light of the 
massive numbers of new entrants due to re-unification and the changes in 
Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the Aussiedler remain a special group. They 
attain the legal status of "Germans" within the meaning of the Basic Law and 
are referred to as status-Deutsche, not foreigners. They are not automatically 
citizens, but they have a statutory right to naturalization if they meet certain 
minimal criteria.250 
E. Aliens Laws 
An "alien" or "foreigner" (Auslltnder) is defmed today, as it has been 
since 1965, as "whoever is not a German within the meaning of Article 116(1) 
of the Basic Law. "251 Status-Germans are not aliens under the 1965 Aliens 
AcfS2 or the 1990 revisions to the Aliens Act. The primary purpose of the 
1965 Act was to authorize the promulgation of administrative regulations,253 
ostensibly to achieve "a liberal and open foreigner policy which facilitates 
entry and residence. "254 However, the 1965 Act left executive 
decision-makers a great deal of discretion and did not grant foreign workers 
a right to residence. That present-day Germany is extremely protective of 
aliens' rights is in large measure a result of judicial aggressiveness in 
construing the rights provided to foreigners in the Basic Law. 255 
The current debate over German Aliens Law began in 1962 when the 
government introduced a legislative proposal to replace the 1938 law 
248. Gesetz zur Anpassung von Eingliederungsleistungen fiir Aussiedler und Obersiedler, Dec. 22, 
1989, BGBI. I 2398 [hereinafter EingliederungsanpassungsgesetzJ. 
249. See 1990 AAG, supra note 86. 
250. See Gesetz zur Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehorigkeit of February 22, 1955, BGBJ. 165, 
§ 6. 
251. 1990 AusIG, supra note 220, § 1(2). 
252. Ausliindergesetz, April 28, 1965, BGBI. I 353 [hereinafter 1965 AusIG). 
253. See, e.g., 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, §§ 2(3), 2(4), 3(2), 5(2), 51. 
254. KAy HAILBRONNER, AUSLANDERRECHr: EIN HANDBUCH 4 (1984) (quoting Bundestagsdruck-
sache IV /868, at 10). 
255. See supra notes 268-285 and accompanying text. 
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governing foreigners in Germany.256 The most significant problem with the 
1938 law was its subjective test for granting residence permits: the question 
was whether "according to [the alien's] personality and the purpose of his visit 
... he is worthy of the requested hospitality."257 The proposed changes, 
incorporated into the 1965 Act, substituted a more objective standard: a 
residence permit "may be issued ... if the presence of the alien does not 
prejudice interests of Germany. "258 This change increased the government's 
control over the duration of an alien's residence, since the government could 
look to state interests, such as the needs of the labor market, to limit an 
alien's stay.259 Indeed, the first comprehensive regulations passed under the 
law expressly required that "a Residence Permit for a foreign worker ... as 
a rule should be granted for at most one year. 260 
The government argued that the goal of this law was to achieve a "liberal 
and open policy towards foreigners."261 Others, however, have argued that 
the Act's true purpose was to control and regulate the flow of immigrant labor 
as an economic resource.262 Under the 1965 Act, workers were permitted 
to enter Germany as needed, and would leave, either voluntarily or by 
deportation, when Germany no longer needed their services or when other 
German interests so required.263 The official perception of the role of 
workers, as embodied in the 1965 Act, has persisted. Today, the German 
government perceives foreigners in Germany to be laborers who, in essence, 
broke an agreement and overstayed their welcome: 
Our recruitment policies for foreign workers in the 1950's and 1960's were not 
aimed at bringing people here as long-term residents . . . The main idea was that 
relatively young workers in Germany would gain professional experience and put 
away some savings in order ultimately to return home to build a better future. This 
did not work out that way in practice . . . . The workers were satisfied with the 
work and the pay . . . . They were not inclined to give up that position after a 
256. Fritz Franz, Zwischenbilanz des deutschen Ausllinderrechts, 1992 ZAR 154, 155 (1992). 
257. AusHinderpolizeiverordnung, Aug 22, 1938, RGBI. I 1053, § 1 ("nachihrerPersiinlichkbeitund 
dem Zweck ihres Aufenthalts .•• daB sie der ihnen gew3hrten Gastfreundschaft wiirdig sind.") (author's 
translation). 
258. 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, § 2(1) ("darf erteilt werden ••• wenn die Anwesenheit des 
Ausliinders Belange der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht beeintriichtigt") (author's translation). 
259. Franz, supra note 256, at 155. 
260. AJlgemeine Verwaltungsvorschriftzur Ausfiihrung des Ausliindergesetzes, July 7,1967, GMBJ. 
231, No.4 on § 7 of the 1965 AusIG, reprinted in Franz, supra note 256 , at 155. 
261. Bundestagsdrucksache IV/868 A.3, cited in Franz, supra note 256, at 155. 
262. E.g., Franz supra note 256, at 155 (arguing 1965 Act "tailored to the potential use of foreign 
workers") (author's translation); see also Knute Dohse & Klaus Groth, Ausllinderverdrlingung, 16 
KRrrlSCHE JUSTIZ 231 (1983). Major economic actors sometimes support this argument: recently Ulrich 
Freiherr von Gienath, of the German Employers Federation, wrote, "[i]n case of a decline in the 
employment situation .•. the foreigners would therefore have to expect to be the first to lose their jobs. 
For this reason it would be absurd to encourage Utopian ideas about the large scale settlement of foreign 
families.· CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 144, at 98. 
263. 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, § 10(1) (listing ten specific grounds for deportation and including 
final provision covering "other substantial interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.") (author's 
translation). 
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short while in return for an uncertain future in their homelands.264 
This view that foreigners are largely an economic resource is an important 
backdrop to any discussion of German treatment of aliens.265 
The 1965 Act did not address many subjects of concern to aliens, 
including such important questions as immigration of dependents and 
procedures for obtaining permanent residence,266 leaving the government to 
adopt regulations to address these topics. As with naturalization law, the 
Lander implement the Aliens Act under federal supervision; as a result, a 
bewildering array of federal and Land administrative regulations and judicial 
decisions have come to control German aliens law. Judicial review follows a 
pattern similar to that found in naturalization: state administrative courts 
review agency actions under the Federal Administrative Court's supervision. 
In addition, in appropriate cases a constitutional complaint may be brought to 
the Federal Constitutional COurt.267 Due to the wide array of governmental 
actors involved in the implementation of the aliens laws, there has been a 
considerable amount of legal unpredictability and flexibility in government 
policy and protections for aliens on humanitarian grounds.268 
In this area, as elsewhere, the German judiciary generally has protected 
the rights of foreigners in the post-war era. The Federal Constitutional Court 
has held that judicial review under Article 19(4) of the Basic Law is available 
for cases involving the deportation of foreigners.269 This approach comports 
with the longstanding German tradition of close judicial review, both factual 
and legal, of administrative decisions.27o In the post-war period the courts 
have combined this tradition with a new emphasis on rights to create a far 
more substantial system of judicial review. 271 
Under the 1965 Aliens Act, a foreigner who wished to live in Germany 
had to apply for a one-year residence permit (Aujenthaltserlaubnis).272 
Aliens who could prove at least four years of residence in Germany and who 
were "economically and socially integrated" could obtain a long-term 
residence permit roughly analogous to U.S. permanent resident statuS.273 A 
1978 administrative guideline had encouraged the issuance of such permits to 
264. Waffenschmidt Speech, supra note 41, at 4 (author's translation). 
265. See generally CASTLES & KOSACK, supra note 144; HOMZE, FOREIGN LABOR IN NAZI 
GERMANY (1967); RIsT, supra note 144. 
266. Other statutes cover related questions. Help in securing employment, for example, is governed 
by the Arbeitsffirderungsgesetz of June 25, 1969, BGBI.I582 (as amended). 
267. GG art. 93(1)(4a). 
268. The government itself conceded in 1990 that this unpredictability was a serious problem. 
Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf fiir ein Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausliinderrechts, 
Bundesratsdrucksache 11/90 (1990) (author's translation). 
269. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1978, 49 BVerfGE 168. 
270. Id. at 180-81, 184-85; see also Neuman, Immigration, supra note 121, at 49. 
271. Neuman; Immigration, supra note 121, at 52. 
272. 1965 AuslG, supra note 252, § 2. 
273. Id. § 8. 
190 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 191 1993
German Law oj Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship 
former guestworkers with at least eiglit years of residence.274 Also in 1978, 
the Federal Constitutional Court held that an alien had a constitutional interest 
in continued residence in Germany after years of routine renewal of his 
residence permit, an interest that limited somewhat the government's 
discretion in handling further renewal applications. The Court held that 
general policy interests were insufficient to outweigh the personal interest 
created by such a history, and ordered administrators to take the applicant's 
residence history into account.275 
Earlier, the Federal Constitutional Court had held that the "principle of 
proportionality," which requires that any restriction on individual liberty be 
carefully weighed against serious public interests, should also apply to cases 
involving foreigners in Germany. 276 The Court has also determined that 
Article 6 of the Basic Law,· which mandates that the state give "special 
protection" to marriage and the family, 277 protects foreigners to some degree 
in Germany. In 1979, the Court refused to hold that Article 6 gives the alien 
spouse of a citizen a right not to be deported; all that was required was for the 
administrator to balance the interests of the individuals and the state.278 In 
1987, the Federal Constitutional Court again considered Article 6 ·when it 
addressed the difficult question of what legal standard an issuing agency 
should use when considering whether to grant initial residence permits to the 
relatives of legal resident aliens, an issue of great importance to the 
entrenched population of foreigners in the Federal Republic. Administrative 
guidelines had adopted threshold requirements of age, length of marriage, and 
pre-application residence periods.279 The Court found that while Article 6's 
family protection guarantee must be considered in determining whether to 
grant family members of resident foreigners permission to reside in Germany, 
Article 6 does not establish a fundamental right for these family members to 
enter Germany. 280 
As regards discrimination against foreigners due to their citizenship status, 
the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a standard that lies somewhere 
274. See Guidelines No.2 & 4 to § 8 of the Ausllindergesetz. Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zur 
Ausfiihrung des Ausllindergesetzes (AusIVwV) of July 7. 1967. amended by Bekanntmachung of May 10. 
1977. GMBI. 202, and ofJuly 7, 1978, GMBI. 268, Cited in 49 BVerfGE 168, 177. 
275. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1978, 49 BVerfGE 186; see also Neuman, lnunigraJion, supra note 121, 
at 49 (discussing Court's reasoning more fully). 
276. See, e.g., Judgment of July 18, 1973.35 BVerfGE 382, 401-07 (public and private interests 
must be weighed with exceptional care in deportation proceedings, which are means of last resort). 
277. GG art. 6(1) ("Marriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state. H). 
278. Judgment ofJuly 18, 1979,51 BVerfGE 386,397. 
279. One federal guideline recommended denial of first-time residence permits to spouses of second 
generation resident aliens unless the resident was at least eighteen, had lived continuously in Germany for 
eight years, and had been married for at least one year. See Judgment of May 12, 1987, 76 BVerfGE 1, 
4. 
280. 76 BVerfGE at 1. In addition, the Court ruled that a three-year post-marriage requirement which 
had been adopted in Baden-Wiirttemberg was unacceptable under GG art. 6. 76 BVerfGE at 5-7. 
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between the strict scrutiny approach that the U.S. Supreme Court takes in 
discrimination cases, and the great deference that the U.S. Supreme Court 
shows in cases involving federal immigration policy. 281 The Federal 
Constitutional Court has ruled that Article 3(1) of the Basic Law, which states 
that "[a]ll persons shall be equal before the law"282 protects aliens.283 
However, Article 3(3), which states that "[n]o one may be disadvantaged or 
favoured because of ... his language, his homeland and origin, "284 does not 
apply to aliens.285 
In 1990, the federal government undertook a comprehensive revision of 
the 1965 Aliens Law.286 The government's stated goal was to limit discre-
tion, clarify residence statuses and visa and passport requirements, and 
liberalize naturalization requirements for young "foreigners" born and raised 
in Germany. 287 In addition to the naturalization revisions discussed 
above,288 the primary change brought about by the new law was the creation 
of four resident alien categories to which the states would be forced to adhere, 
thereby limiting their administrative leeway.289 The Aujenthaltserlaubnis290 
is a general residence permit which may be extended; the Aujenthaltsberech-
tiguni91 is the rough equivalent of U.S. permanent resident alien status; the 
Aujenthaltsbewilliguni92 is a specific, short-term residence permit, which 
requires a specific purpose; and the Aujenthaltsbejugnis293 is a residence 
permit based on humanitarian or political grounds. 
In fact, these revisions did little to limit administrative discretion.294 
Grounds for deportation are still fairly fluid; government officials may order 
deportation whenever "public security and order or other significant interests 
281. Compare Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (discrimination under state law based on 
alienage subject to strict scrutiny review under equal protection clause) with Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 
67 (1976) (upholding limit on enrollment of aliens in Medicare program to permanent residents who have 
at least five years residence in U.S.); see also Neuman, lnunigration, supra note 121, at 66. 
282. GG art. 3(1). 
283. Judgment of March 20, 1979, 51 BVerfGE 1, 30. 
284. GG art. 3(3). 
285. 51 BVerfGE at 30 (invalidating social insurance law which suspended payments to non-Germans 
during periods of voluntary residence outside of Germany). 
286. 1990 AuslG, supra note 220. 
287. Statement of Legislative Intent, supra note 219, at 11, 14-16,21. 
288. See supra notes 218-225 and accompanying text. 
289. Statement of Legislative Intent, supra note 219, at 14-16. 
290. 1990 AusIG, supra note 220, § 15. 
291. ld. § 27. 
292. ld. § 28. 
293. ld. § 30. 
294. Germany authorizes courts to review administrative action as regards the legal limits of 
discretion and compliance with the purpose of the law. An agency may generally adopt necessary and 
appropriate means to achieve authorized ends, and exceptionally broad delegations of discretion, like those 
of the Alien's Law, confer extremely wide latitude to the agency. Erhard Denninger, Judicial Review 
Revisited: The German Experience, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1985). 
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of [Germany] are impinged upon."295 In addition, the 1990 reforms did 
nothing to change the essentially discretionary nature of the granting of 
residency permits. As in the 1965 law,296 the 1990 revisions grant the 
Interior Ministry the authority to draft regulations controlling the grant of 
residence permits for foreign workers.297 Under Sections 6 and 7 of the new 
law, a residence permit is to be granted only if the alien's stay "neither 
negatively affects nor poses a threat to the interests (Interessen) of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. "298 This change marks little more than a linguistic 
alteration of the 1965 Act, which stated, "[t]he residence permit may be 
granted if the presence of the foreigner does not prejudice interests (Belange) 
of Germany.,,299 Thus, if anything, the new law seems more discretionary 
than the old law as it applies to residence rights for foreign workers.3°O 
German aliens law thus reflects the tensions discussed throughout this 
article. Government decision-makers historically have viewed aliens law as a 
matter of economics and labor policy rather than as a matter of cultural 
integration or human rights. As one German writer has noted, " [i]n the middle 
point of foreigner politics stand the interests of the German labor mar-
ket."30l Immigration has never been the government's goal. Liberal constitu-
tional legal structures mitigate the discretionary and instrumental nature of 
aliens statutes. Without the societal goals of immigration, multi-culturalism, 
and ethnic diversity, however, society will not lend practical support to 
judicial intervention on behalf of foreigners. Lawmakers attuned to popular 
opinion probably will consider public reaction in drafting any future revisions 
to the aliens laws. A popular backlash thus develops which affects not only 
foreigners but the law itself. There is no better example of this phenomenon 
than the German asylum debate. 
F. Asylum Laws 
The legal structures defming the right to asylum have affected the political 
debate in Germany on both immigration in general and asylum in particular. 
295. 1990 AusIG, supra note 220, § 45. 
296. 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, § 2. 
297. 1990 AusIG, supra note 220, § 10(2). 
298. ld. § 7(3). 
299. 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, § 2(1) ("Die Aufentshaltserlaubnis darf erteilt werden, wenn die 
Anwesenheit des AusHinders Belange der Bundesrepublik Deuts~hland nicht beeintriichtigt. H). Some 
German commentators have noted the continuity of the term Belange from § 10 of the Nazi Decree on the 
Treatment of Foreigners of 1939, Verordnung iiber die Behandlung von Ausliindern of September 5, 1939, 
RGBl.I 1667, to 1965, and argue that this grant of tremendous government power served interests in 1965 
that were uncomfortably similar to those of 1939. See, e.g., Dohse & Groth, supra note 262, at 232 
(referring primarily to use of foreign laborers); see also supra notes 262-264 and accompanying text 
(discussing foreign labor in German history). 
300. Franz, supra note 256, at 159-60 (referring to 1990 law as "the emperor's new clothes" and 
noting, among other problems, continuing role played by discretion). 
30l. KARL-HEINZ MEIER-BRAUN, GASTARBEITER ODER EINWANDERER? 23 (1980). 
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Basic Law Article 16(2) provides that "persons persecuted on political grounds 
shall enjoy the right of asylum."302 The drafters of the Basic Law saw this 
provision as an important statement of their commitment to a strong human 
rights policy in the aftermath of the war.303 Article 16(2) is therefore 
emblematic of the rejection of National Socialism which lies at the core of the 
Basic Law; in addition, it reflects the drafters' concerns about political 
persecution in Soviet-bccupied countries.304 
The asylum provision was controversial even in 1948, and there was 
significant debate over the language of the provision.305 These debates 
clearly indicate the drafters' awareness of the political importance of the 
asylum guarantee.306 Among their specific concerns were two that have 
become major problems in Germany today: the danger of giving border police 
too much power to make threshold decisions,307 and the question of the right 
to work.308 The sparse phrasing the drafters finally adopted for Article 
16(2), has left many,gaps in German asylum law. The result is that this 
constitutional right, the central provision in the current immigration debate, 
is itself largely an empty arena in which highly contradictory goals and ideals 
clash. 
The first important elaboration of the constitutional right to asylum 
occurred when Germany signed the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention.309 
As a result of this accession, German courts have construed Article 16(2) to 
include persons persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, or 
membership in a particular social group, thus tracking the Convention's 
definition of a Irefugee."310 
Until the mid-1970's, asylum was not a controversial political or legal 
issue in Germany. Applications were handled by administrative agencies 
without explicit statutory guidance. As applications began to rise precipitously 
302. GG art. 16(2). Article 16(3) prevents the extradition of German citizens, and regulates 
denaturalization and expatriation. GG art. 16(3). 
303. See generally, HELMUr QUARITSCH, EINWANDERUNGSLAND BUNDESREPUBLIKDEtrrsCHLAND? 
AKTUELLE REFORMFRAGEN DES AUSLANDERREClITS 28-40 (1981). 
304. Id. 
305. HANS KREUZBERG, GRUNDREClIT AUF AsYL 21-25 (1984). 
306. See QUARITSCH, supra note 303, at 28-40. The debates also suggest that the drafters did not 
foresee that hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers would enter Germany pursuant to this provision. 
307. Dr. von Mangoldt pointed this out, and proposed a formulation that would in essence have 
granted a right of entry to permit adjudication of claims. Id. at 34, 63. 
308. Two of the strong supporters of the asylum provision, Renner of the KPD and Wagner of the 
SPD, both of whom had sought asylum during the Nazi period, stressed the importance of linking the right 
to work to the asylum provision itself. It appears, however, that this did not pass because the drafters 
believed that GG art. 2 (the "free development of personality" clause) protected asylum-seekers' right to 
work. Id. at 44, 49. 
309. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137. The Federal Republic of Germany signed the convention on November 19, 1951 and 
ratified it on December 1, 1953. BGB!. II 559. 
310. See Mary Ellen Fullerton, Persecurion Due To Membership In A Particular Social Group: 
Jurisprudence in the Federal Republic Of Germany, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 381, 389 n.30 (1990). 
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through the 1970's, however, the government concluded that it had to 
centralize applications processing in order to handle the load.311 In the early 
1980's, the government changed its policy in order to hinder entry by 
applicants with frivolous claims, expedite the adjudication process, and limit 
both employment authorization for applicants and their access to social welfare 
benefits.312 In 1980, for instance, the government adopted visa requirements 
to impede applicants from the main sending countries - Turkey, Mghanistan, 
India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh - from travelling to West Germany.313 
The visa measures failed to stem the flow of asylum-seekers, in part because 
many applicants discovered they could easily travel to East Berlin and then 
secure permission to enter West Berlin.314 
German asylum practice is now' governed primarily by an elaborate 
Asylum Procedures Law passed in 1982.315 The basic procedural feature of 
the system is its high degree of centralization and bureaucratization. The law 
contains a specific mechanism for the allocation of asylum-seekers among the 
Lander based on a percentage formula that roughly tracks the population and 
resources of each Land. Asylum-seekers are not entitled to choose their place 
of residence.316 The 1982 law also adopted controversial guidelines for 
"collective accommodations for asylum-seekers. "317 Most state governments 
supported this idea in hopes of saving money and deterring asylum seek-
ers.318 Critics, however, saw disturbing similarities between the mandatory 
group housing and detention camps.319 In addition, the segregation of 
asylum-seekers clearly contributes to the public perception of asylum-seekers 
as social outcasts. 
Applications for asylum are first made to local "aliens authorities," who 
forward the applications to a centralized federal agency, 320 which employs 
approximately 1,000 workers.321 Decision-makers are divided into special-
311. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Gennany and the 
Republic of France: Lessons for the United States. 17 MICH. J.L. REFORM 183, 197-203 (1984). 
Applications rose from 5,595 in 1973 to over 9,000 in 1974 and 1975 and from -51,493 in 1979 to over 
100,000 in 1980. The numbers temporarily declined in 1981-2 before beginning to rise dramatically again. 
ld. at 197. 
312. ld. at 211. 
313. ld. at 201. 
314. Mary Ellen Fullerton, Restricting the Flow of Asylum-Seekers in Belgium. Denmark. the Federal 
Republic of Gennany. and the Netherlands, 29 VA. J. INT'L. L. 69 (1988) [hereinafter Fullerton, 
Restricting the Flow] 
315. Gesetz iiber das Asylverfahren, July 16, 1982, BGB!. 1946 [hereinafter 1982 AsyIVfG]. The 
specific procedures of German asylum law have been well described in a number of recent articles in 
English and will not be repeated here. See. e.g .• Aleinikoff, supra note 311; Fullerton, Restricting the 
Flow, supra note 314; Neuman, Immigration, supra note 121. 
, 316. 1982 AsylVfG, supra note 315, § 22. 
317. ld. § 23. 
318. Aleinikoff, supra note 311, at 203. 
319. ld. at 204. 
320. Bundesamt fiir die Anerkennung auslandischer Fliichtlinge (Federal Office for the Recognition 
of Foreign Refugees) [BAF]. 
321. Interview with Wolfgang Weickhardt, Section President for the BAF, in Zirndorf, Germany 
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ized working groups to achieve greater knowledge of particular sending 
regions. As in the United States, advocates for asylum-seekers have charged 
that political considerations have played an improper role in German asylum 
determinations.322 Government decision-makers, however, proudly proclaim 
their expertise and independence from explicit political control.323 Neverthe-
less, judicial review has become a major issue in the German asylum 
debate.324 
Asylum cases are reviewed initially by administrative law courts located 
in the state in which the applicant resides.325 The judges in these courts take 
this review very seriously but face a staggering case load. For more than a 
decade, many judges have chosen not to decide cases, knowing that declining 
to reach a decision will allow the alien to remain in Germany.326 After a 
number of years, such asylum applicants may become eligible for residence 
permits under the Aliens Law.327 The 1982 Asylum Law was designed to 
expedite some cases by creating a sub-category of "obviously unfounded" 
cases in which appeals must be fIled within seven days to avoid the possibility 
of deportation.328 If the court upholds the agency determination, the asylum 
seeker has no further appeal under the statute.329 
By the mid-1980's, it became apparent that these restrictions33o were not 
reducing the tide of asylum-seekers because the judicial system seemed 
incapable of rendering quick decisions to expedite the deportations of 
initially-denied asylum-seekers.331 As the numbers continued to rise, 
legislative attention turned again to the issue of border control. 332 The ease 
with which asylum-seekers received transit visas to West Berlin from the East 
German government was a major point of contention until the GDR agreed to 
limit transit visas on October 1, 1986. The immediate result was dramatic, but 
short-lived.333 Thus, in January 1987, the government passed a new asylum 
(June 1990) [hereinafter Weickhardt Interview]. 
322. Aleinikoff, supra note 311, at 205. 
323. Weickhardt Interview, supra note 321. 
324. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
325. Aleinikoff, supra note 311, at 207. 
326. ld. at 208. 
327. Under the 1965 Aliens Law the l.11nder developed flexible policies that allowed aliens denied 
asylum to remain if they presented compel\ing humanitarian claims; this was known as Duldung 
("tolerance"). 1965 AusIG, supra note 252, § 17. The 1990 law eliminated this category, but provides for 
the granting of an Aufenthaltsbefugnis, a residence permit granted for humanitarian reasons. 1990 AusIG, 
supra note 220, § 30(2). 
328. 1982 AsylVro, supra note 315, § 11(1) (German phrase oifensichtlich unbegrllndet). 
329. An asylum-seeker might still make a constitutional claim under GG art. 19(4) ("ShOUld any 
person's rights be violated by public authority, recourse to the court sha\1 be open to him. "). 
330. Relatively minor changes were made to the Asylum Procedure Law in 1984. See Erstes Gesetz 
zur Anderung des Asylverfahrensgesetzes, July 11, 1984, BGBI. I 874. 
331. In 1990 the BAF took an average of 9-11 months to decide on an application. Appeals to the 
courts often took another 2-3 years. Weickhardt Interview, supra note 321. 
332. Fu\1erton, Restricting the Flow, supra note 314, at 64-70. 
333. ld. at 69. 
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law to address the problems of border controls, employment authorization, 
and asylum procedures.334 This law expressly authorized border police to 
deny entry to an asylum-seeker who has "found protection elsewhere, ,,335 
who has spent more than three months in a European Community country or 
other "safe state" (the law lists Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway), 
or who already possesses a refugee travel document. However, even those 
denied at the border retain the constitutional right of judicial review and must 
be allowed to enter Germany to pursue their appeals.336 
The 1987 law lengthened the employment ban for asylum-seekers from 
two years to five years.337 This change was implemented to protect German 
jobs, but it also increased asylum-seekers' dependence on government 
stipends. Neo-Nazis argued that the "lazy" asylum-seekers should not be 
supported by hard-working Germans, and the stipends even troubled many 
mainstream Germans. As a result, on July 1, 1991, the government lifted the 
employment ban.338 Work applicants must now show that neither a German 
nor a European Community citizen is available to do a particular job.339 
Despite this restriction, public attention has focused once again on whether or 
not asylum-seekers take jobs away from Germans.340 
The 1987 amendments also dealt quite specifically with the substantive 
grounds for asylum. Applicants who come to Germany fleeing armed conflict 
or general conditions of upheaval may now see their cases denied as 
"manifestly unfounded. "341 Furthermore, post-flight grounds for asylum 
(grounds that arise after the applicant has left his or her country of nationality) 
are now precluded as a basis for seeking asylum.342 However, these changes 
have barely dampened the influx of asylum-seekers. 
The German government has also pursued multilateral solutions to the 
asylum crisis. The Schengen Convention,343 which Germany, France and the 
334. Gesetz zur Anderung asylverfahrensrechtIicher, arbeitserlaubnisrechtlicher und ausllinder-
rechtlicher Vorschriften, Jan. 6, 1987, BGB!. I 89 [hereinafter 1987 Asylum Law]. 
335. ld. at § 1(2). This is defined as a three-month stay without threat of political persecution. 
336. This right is based on GG art. 16(2). See Pfaff, supra note 13, at 131. 
337. 1987 Asylum Law, supra note 334, § 2(1). From 1980 to 1987 applicants from countries other 
than those of Eastern Europe had to wait two years before receiving work authorization; those from 
Eastern Europe had to wait one year. Sechste Verordnung zur Anderung der Arbeitserlaubnisverordnung, 
of 1981, BGB!. I 1042, § 1(2). Even after 1987, this one year period for those from Eastern Europe 
remained in effect. See Fullerton, Restricting the Flow, supra note 314, at 72. 
338. Haberland Letter, supra note 38. 
339. ld. 
340. The German Information Center responds to this perception by reminding the public that asylum 
seekers can only work in a job that no German or European Community member wants. Some Asylum 
Seekers Get Temporary Worlc Pennits, Jobs, WEEK 1N GERMANY, Jan. 22, 1993, at 4. 
341. 1987 Asylum Law, supra note 334, § 1(8); see also Fullerton, supra note 314, at 70 n.179. 
342. 1987 Asylum Law, supra note 334, § 1(1). 
343. Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 14, 
1985, and Convention Applying Their Agreement, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 [hereinafter Schengen 
Agreement and Convention]. 
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Benelux states signed in 1990, is the most specific and significant current 
European legal response to non-European Community refugees.344 The 
important provisions of the Convention aim to standardize border controls 
among the parties;34S make special provisions for cooperation in the areas 
of drugs, arms, third country nationals, and refugees;346 and institute a 
computerized information system to facilitate the controls of criminals and 
terrorists.347 Although the European Community has not yet adopted the 
Convention,348 there are still reasonably good prospects that it will do so. 
The asylum provisions have generated the most controversy of any of the 
Schengen provisions. To prevent the circulation of asylum applicants, the state 
of first application remains responsible for an asylum-seeker.349 That state 
must evaluate the application in accordance with the Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees and the New York Protocol.350 The responsible state 
must also re-admit an applicant found to be illegally present in another state, 
and must expel applicants not admitted to residence.351 This system will 
almost inevitably lead to a more restrictive asylum model for relatively liberal 
asylum states like Germany as the members search for an acceptable common 
denominator;352 in fact, the existence of the Agreement may legitimate 
restrictions to Germany's asylum law. In the final analysis, the Schengen 
Agreement may not be sufficiently comprehensive or flexible enough to deal 
with current realities, but its existence makes it a critical part of the German 
asylum debate.353 
There is a wide-spread perception in Germany that asylum cases are 
prolonged by asylum-seekers, their advocates, and the legal system gener-
344. The Agreement grew out of the 1984 Saarbriicken Agreement on abolishing border controls 
signed on June 14, 1985 by the Federal Republic of Gennany, France, and the Benelux countries. ld. 
pmbl. ' 
345. ld. arts. 2, 3, 6. 
346. ld. arts. 4, 5, 28-91. 
347. This is called the "Schengen Infonnation System." ld. arts. 92-119. 
348. Some of the original parties have not yet ratified the Agreement, and it has encountered serious 
opposition in the Netherlands. Bertold Huber, Asyl- wul Ausllinderrechr in der Europllischen Gemeinschaft, 
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERW ALTUNGSRECHr, July 1992, at 618, 620. Italy joined the group in December 
1990, and Portugal and Spain joined in June 1991. J.P.H. Donner, Abolition of Border Controls 1, 2 
(unpublished manuscript, printed by T.M.C. Asser Institut, The Hague, in Free Movement of Persons in 
Europe, Asser Institute Colloquium on European Law (Sept. 12-13, 1991), on file with author). 
349. Schengen Agreement and Convention, supra note 343, arts. 29-30. 
350. ld. arts. 28, 29. 
351. ld. arts. 33, 34. 
352. Strict use of the Geneva Convention's definition, for example, excludes the "humanitarian" or 
"de facto refugees" that currently enter Gennany in some cases. Dr. Eckart Nanz, a Gennan negotiator 
at Schengen, has noted that if Gennany continues to give a broad reading to its constitutional right to 
asylum, that reading will likely be seen as incompatible with the goals of the other Schengen states. 
Interview with Dr. Eckart Nanz, in Bonn, Gennany (June 11, 1990). 
353. To illustrate, CSU Chainnan Waigel asserted in April 1992 that his party would not support the 
Schengen Agreement unless its passage were linked to a constitutional amendment to limit the right to 
asylum. Kohl Allies Threaten Ee Border Deal Over Asylum, Reuters Library Report, Apr. 15, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. 
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ally.354 Critics of asylum law argue incorrectly that Basic Law Article 16(2) 
is the reason for judicial delay. The real cause of judicial delay is the intricate 
protective review procedures mandated by German law for administrative 
decisions involving basic rights generally,355 and by the extraordinary care 
that Germanjudges, who are responsible for an independent, de novo review, 
often give to these cases.356 It is thus the underlying German commitment 
to the rule of law that prolongs asylum review. As such, strict adherence to 
the rule of law in asylum cases has become an important issue in the asylum 
debate. 
While some critics argue that the government has devoted too few 
resources to developing a workable asylum system within the framework of 
the Basic Law, the louder call is for a far more drastic change - a revision 
of Article 16(2) itself. For example, in October 1992 members of the 
CDU/CSU coalition and the PDP passed a non-binding Bundestag resolution 
calling for the striking of Article 16 entirely and its replacement with a 
passage declaring that the Federal Republic of Germany grants asylum on the 
basis of the Geneva Convention alone.357 Such a change would render the 
status of asylum-seekers in Germany more precarious than it currently is, 
since the protections of the Geneva Convention are not nearly as extensive as 
those provided by current German law.358 The CSU voted in October 1992 
to support striking the asylum article from the Basic Law and replacing it with 
a provision that reads "asylum is provided for; prerequisites, content and 
limits are laid down by law. "359 The SPD, however, had resisted these 
moves, insisting on a statutory approach to asylum reform rather than a 
constitutional one. 
The government drafted a compromise statute,360 which the Bundestag 
passed on June 26, 1992.361 By the time it passed, however, the hope that 
354. The asylum statute passed in 1992 therefore contains a number of provisions designed to speed 
up asylum cases. See irifra note 361 and accompanying text. 
355. See, e.g., GG art. 19(4). 
356. See Aleinikoff, supra note 311, at 207. One judge in Cologne reported that he spends 
approximately half of his time dealing with asylum cases. However, the same judge also estimated that 
of some 4,000 attorneys in the Cologne area, only 30-50 might handle asylum cases, of whom perhaps 
ten really care and do a thorough job. Judge X Interview, supra note 58. 
357. Governing Coalition Passes Resolution Calling for Change of Asylum Law: SPD Boycotts the 
Vote, WEEK IN GERMANY, Oct. 16, 1992, at 1. 
358. See generally Huber, supra note 348. 
359. Governing Coalition Passes Resolution Callingfor Change of Asylum Law, WEEK IN GERMANY, 
Oct. 16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. 
360. Number of Asylum-Seekers Rose in February, WEEK IN GERMANY,' Mar. 6, 1992, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. This bill 'shifted responsibility for housing and caring for asylum-
seekers from local communities to the federal government. Despite terrible historic resonances, asylum 
seekers are to be detained in special "camps" or ·centers" while awaiting decisions in their cases; 
however, movement in and out of the centers is not to be restricted. [d. 
361. Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Asylverfahrens, June 26, 1992, BGBI. I 1126 [hereinafter 
AsylVfNG]. To date, the impact of this law is unclear. 
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it could afford a solution was already dim. This law went into effect on July 
1, 1992; its most important provisions relating to speeding up asylum proce-
dures, however, are not scheduled to go into effect until April 1, 1993.362 
As violence against foreigners continued over the summer of 1992, 
pressure increased on the SPD to agree to a constitutional amendment. For 
example, Federal Interior Minister Rudolf Seiters stated that the right to 
asylum was being used primarily as an instrument of uncontrolled economic 
migration, and that "[w]e will not solve the problem without an amendment 
to the Basic Law. "363 In his eyes, the SPD (and the Free Democratic Party 
[FDP]) should agree to a constitutional amendment to ensure that the 
Rechtsstaat ("state based on law") remains effective while ending the misuse 
of the right to asylum.364 Finally, after chairman Bjorn Engholm threatened 
to resign if the SPD did not change its position, the party agreed at an 
emergency meeting in mid-November to open negotiations with the ruling 
coalition on amending the constitutional right to asylum.365 On December 
15, 1992, the SPD parliamentary group voted 101-64 (with five abstentions) 
to approve the CDU/CSU proposal to amend the constitutional asylum 
provision.366 This amended provision will bar asylum applications from 
anyone seeking to enter Germany from "safe third countries," a category that 
includes every state bordering Germany. 367 
By far the most radical suggestion for stemming the influx of asylum-
seekers was Helmut Kohl's November 1, 1992 threat to declare a legislative 
state of emergency under Basic Law Article 81368 and to seek to pass laws 
restricting the right to asylum by simple majority vote in the Bundestag. No 
government has ever invoked this provision, and German constitutional 
experts hurried to state that Kohl was on shaky legal ground at best. 369 
362. ld. art. 5. 
363. Asylbewerberzahlen gegeniiber 1991 verdoppelt, 1992 ZAR 98, 98. 
364. ld. 
365. Dempsey, Germany Closer, supra note 126, at 14. 
366. Opposition Approves Germany's Asylum Deal, Reuters Library Report, Dec. 15, 1992 available 
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File [hereinafter Asylum Deal]. Many SPD members have expressed 
outrage over this move. In a highly publicized move, Giinter Grass accused the party of "hypocrisy" and 
formally resigned. Gennan Writer Quits Pany on Asylum Issue, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 30, 1992, at 10. 
367. Coalition Parties and SPD Debate Proposed Asylum Legislation in First Reading, WEEK IN 
GERMANY, Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Alleur File. The deal, however, seems 
extremely fragile: the two groups had begun to quarrel over technicalities by early January 1993. Tom 
Heneghan, Bonn Steps Up Pressure for Quick Asylum Refonn, Reuters Library Report, Jan. 12, 1993 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. 
368. GG art. 81. Kohl argued that the government had become gridlocked over asylum within the 
meaning of GG art. 81(2), and challenged the SPD to cease its opposition to "a reasonable and effective 
solution." Das ist der Staatsstreich, DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 2, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Staatsstreich). Even 
members of Kohl's own party publicly questioned his position; as Rupert Scholz, a prominent CDU legal 
expert, put it: "[t]he asylum-seekers are surely not an invasion." Id. at 19. 
369. For example, constitutional law expert Jiirgen Kuhling stated that the Basic Law did not 
contemplate this sort of state of emergency. Moreover, in his opinion Kohl's suggestion was a "dangerous 
game" that suggested that a change in the Basic Law could solve the problems with asylum cases, when 
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The current call to amend the Basic Law's right to asylum is problematic 
in part because more than the right to asylum is at stake. The ostensible goals 
of such an amendment include limiting the right of entry and limiting judicial 
involvement by simplifying procedures for rejecting applications and stripping 
away "ponderous formalities II for certain frivolous categories such as 
economic refugees.370 The current proposals for reforming administrative 
asylum proceedings could accelerate asylum cases without changing the Basic 
Law, although this may diminish the attention adminstrators provide each 
individual case.371 A change in the constitution, however, would represent 
a capitulation to the radical right and a rejection of one of the humanitarian 
centerpieces of the post-war Federal Republic. Such a move, especially if 
unaccompanied by changes to citizenship law and the Aussiedler provisions, 
will tilt Germany toward a restrictive, mono-cultural, and vo!kisch model of 
society.372 Thus, German policy-makers should ask themselves not merely 
how important Article 16 is to the legal system, but also how important it is 
to post-war Germany's self-understanding. 
IV. GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 
A. The Kein Einwanderungsland Principle 
In the poison cupboard of contemporary taboos stands a flask with the label 
'Country of Immigration.' Within it squats a spirit. Whoever frees him, so goes 
the political wise talk ... will be lost, and with him the nation and the people.373 
The most venerable and famous German government postulate about 
immigration is that Germany is now (and has always been) kein 
Einwanderungsland ("not an immigration country").374 Kay Hailbronner, for 
in fact the problem lay neither with the constitutional right to asylum nor with judicial review, but rather 
with the length of the proceedings. DER SPIEGEL, Nov. 16, 1992, at 53; see also Fisher, supra note 15, 
at A16. One obvious problem is that GG art. 81(4) precludes amendment, repeal, or suspension of the 
Basic Law by a statute enacted pursuant to GG art. 81(2). If a move such as proposed by Kohl were to 
succeed, it would enable the Chancellor to achieve by legislation (which requires only a majority in the 
Bundestag) that which he originally sought to accomplish by constitutional amendment (which requires a 
two-thirds majority). See Staatsstreich, supra note 368, at 18. 
370. See Eckhardt Schiffer, Refugee Status in Germany, GERMAN COMMENTS 78, 79-80 (1992). 
371. In addition, the removal of GG art. 16(2) could also introduce discretion into the German asylum 
calculus. 
372. President Richard von Weizlicker recognized this when he called in his Christmas Eve speech 
on Germans to broaden the definition of citizenship as part of the response to what he called Germany's 
"fall of unrest. " Leader Asks Germans to Embrace Foreigners, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 25, 1992, at 29. 
373. KNIGm & KOWALSKY, supra note 81, at 17, quoting KLAus J. BADE, DIE EINWANDER-
UNGSSlTUATION: ERFAHRUNGEN - PROBLEME - PERSPECTNEN ("1m Giftschrank amtlich tabuisierter 
Zeitbegriffe steht eine Flasche mit der Aufschrift 'Einwanderungsland.' Darin hockt ein Geist. Wer ibn 
befreit, so geht die Rede Politischer Weisheit ••. der ist verloren und mit ihm Land und Leute.") 
(author's translation). 
374. Germany is not the only nation to use such a phrase. The Swedish government, for example, 
201 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 202 1993
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 18:155, 1993 
example, cites it as one of the three fundamental principles that characterize 
the field of German immigration law. 375 The German government uses kein 
Einwanderungsland to mean that Germany does not consider itself to be a 
"classical" immigration country like Canada or Australia, which pursue an 
active immigration policy to fill territorial space or meet demographic need. 
It is true, of course, that there are today millions of foreign-born persons in 
Germany who could fairly be called immigrants, people who have given up 
their former homes or have even been born and raised in Germany, attended 
school there and are, in most respects, fully integrated into German culture. 
Yet, in the government's eyes this situation is basically a mistake: 
Germany has never pursued an active immigration policy. We are one of the most 
thickly settled countries in the world. We have never sought people from other 
countries to settle here permanently .... We have never had the need to fill 
unpopulated regions with immigrants .... Our recruitment of workers in the 50's 
and 60's did not have the goal of bringing people here as immigrants .... But the 
workers we employed were satisfied with their work and the wages which were 
offered them. They were not ready to abandon their positions . . . in favor of an 
uncertain future in their homelands. Also, German employers did not want to lose 
good workers either. In 1965, the German government itself agreed to permit these 
workers to bring their spouses and children here. More and more children were 
born and raised in Germany since then. The source of this immigration was 
therefore not so much intentional immigration policy as the unforeseen conse-
quences of labor policy. 376 
Germany did not intend to attract immigrants in the past, nor does it now 
aspire to do so. 
The kein EinwanderungsZand principle has a clear ring to it and both 
historic and legal resonance that undoubtedly account for its frequent 
invocation. Yet a closer look reveals that this principle is troubling and 
seriously flawed. Many Germans who embrace the kein Einwanderungsland 
principle, like Kay Hailbronner, speak of a dichotomy between the "classical" 
immigration countries and Continental European states. In their eyes the latter 
can, and perhaps should, use race or ethnicity to mold their immigration 
policies because "every nation, on the basis of its own history, tradition, and 
contemporary situation, has to decide what citizenship policy would best 
accord with its own interests."m In this view ethnic ties provide both an 
has invoked it as well. See Brubaker, supra note 32, at 117. 
While the exact origin of this phrase in Germany is unclear, it seems to have come into common 
usage around 1970 in conjunction with the debate over the decision to stop the recruitment of guestworkers 
and the attendant controversy about their status in Germany. A 1978 court decision mentioned the slogan 
but deemed it insufficient as a justification for the government's decision to reject a foreigner's application 
to prolong his stay. Judgement of Sept. 26, 1978, 49 BVerfGE 168, 186; see also supra note 275 
(discussing decision). The phrase also appears in the naturalization regulations. Naturalization Guidelines, 
supra note 174, § 2.3. It has, however, become a part of political discourse as well as a legal guideline, 
see, e.g., Waffenschmidt Speech, supra note 41, and should be analyzed as such. 
375. Hailbronner, supra note 37, at 67. 
376. Partial translation, summary and paraphrase of Waffenschmidt Speech, supra note 41. 
377. Hailbronner, supra note 37, at 75. 
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objectively legitimate and popularly accepted gauge of "solidarity", "loyalty," 
and "common interests. ,,378 The treatment of the Aussiedler reflects this 
belief. If ethnic Germans abroad are still members of das Yolk and not 
foreigners, then the Yolk-based laws governing the return of the Aussiedler are 
not laws of immigration. This conception of the role of ethnicity is troubling 
given its historic resonances within Germany, and is also problematic as a 
depiction of reality. Other than as an acceptance of "blood" bonds, there is 
absolutely no reason to believe that Volkszugehonge from Russia or Romania, 
people who may have been separated from the "Fatherland" for hundreds of 
years, speak little or no German, and have hundreds of years of non-German 
history immediately behind them, have more in common with Berliners than 
do third-generation descendants of guest-workers. Thus opponents of 
government policy can pointedly note that the kein Einwanderungsland 
principle rests on the volkisch conception of the German nation.379 
The second major problem with the principle is that the underlying view 
of what makes an "immigration" country is unrealistic. Rather than something 
a country "is" or "is not," this is a question of where a country falls on a 
continuum based on a variety of factors: border controls, citizenship policies, 
multicultural aspirations. Ironically, for example, rules of free movement for 
persons in the European Community have rendered German borders more 
porous, at least for EC nationals, than U.S. borders.l80 In addition, a 
sizeable percentage of the German popUlation, some seven percent in the 
former Bundesrepublik, consists of people who have come from outside 
Germany's borders or their descendants.3sI Unlike the government of the 
United States, however, the current German government does not consider 
immigration to be a defming national ideal. On the other hand, the United 
states, which is perhaps the most famous Einwanderungsland and prides itself 
on that characterization, has never in fact fit the model. 3S2 Rather than being 
ld. 
378. Hailbronner writes: 
Political communities formed for self-preservation or the protection and advancement of common 
interests or united by shared historical experience will entrust power only to those persons from 
whom they can expect a feeling of solidarity and loyalty, only to those who can be expected to 
share common interests. The United States and Canada, basically nations composed of 
immigrants from a variety of cultures, have conceptions of citizenship differing sharply from 
those prevailing on the Continent. 
379. See, e.g., AxEL SCHULTE ET AL., AUSLANDERlNDERBUNDESREPUBLIK(1985) (containing left-
wing theoretical essays on SUbject); Zuleeg, supra note 35, at 1. 
380. See KAy HAlLBRONNER, AUSLANDERRECIIT: EIN HANDBUCH 22-31 (1989). 
381. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text . 
. 382. Since at least the late nineteenth century, the United States has restricted immigration by, among 
other categories: 
(1) race (Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 
220, 23 Stat. 115, amended by Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504, repealed by Chinese 
Exclusion Acts Repeal Act, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943)); 
(2) national origin (quota laws based on national origins were first instituted in 1921, Quota Act, ch. 
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a reflection of reality, then, whether a nation has the status of "immigration 
country" is often more a question of national myth than reality. 
The kein Einwanderungsland principle is thus disturbing for two reasons. 
First, it rests largely on the vlJlkisch reasoning that has had such awful results 
in Germany's past. Wide acceptance of the principle, even if unconscious of 
the racialist basis, tends to validate this kind of thinking, and makes it more 
likely that purely vlJlkisch positions may again become acceptable in the 
future. Second, it tends to obscure the real issue facing Germany. This is not 
whether Germany is an "immigration country" - it both is and economically 
needs to be383 - but how political and legal practice should respond to that 
fact.384 
8, § 2; 42 Stat. 5 (1921) (limiting annual immigration to three percent of "foreign-born persons of such 
nationality resident in the United States [in] 1910. "), amended by Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11, 
43 Stat. 153, 159, repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § l(e), 79 Stat. 911. But if. the 
new "Diversity Visa" program, Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314, 
100 Stat. 3359, 3439 (providing 5,000 visa numbers in each of fiscal years 1987 and 1988 for persons 
"adversely affected by the enactment of Public Law 89-236"); Immigration Amendments of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-658, §§ 2, 3, 102 Stat. 3908 (extending § 314 of 1986 amendments and providing "10,000 
visa numbers in each of fiscal years 1990 and 1991" for persons from "underrepresented countries"); 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 131-33, 104 Stat. 4978, 4997-5001, amended by 
Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232 
title III, § 302(b)(6), 105 Stat. 1743 (making 40,000 visas per year available in each of fiscal years 1992, 
1993 and 1994 to certain aliens from "adversely effected" foreign states»; 
(3) ideology (Act of June 25, 1798, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (authorizing President "to order aliens as 
he shall judge dangerous ••• to depart"); Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214 
(making ineligible for admission "anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate overthrow by force 
or violence of the Government of the United States or of all governments or forms of law"); Act of Oct. 
16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (expanding and further specifying bar on subversives); Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(28), 66 Stat. 163, 184; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(Supp.III 1991) 
(current ideological exclusion provisions»; 
(4) sexual preference (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 212(a)(13), 66 Stat. 163, 
183 ("[a]liens coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act"); Act of Oct. 3, 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 15(b), 79 Stat. 911, 919 (amending § 212(a)(4) mental health provisions to include 
"sexual deviation"». 
Thus, Aristide Zolberg's contention that only the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa (the traditional "immigration lands") "remain open to general immigration" requires 
substantial qualification. Zolberg, supra note 4, at 41. Family relationships similar to those in fact required 
in the United States will also admit an immigrant into Germany since marriage to a German leads quickly 
to citizenship. RuStAG, supra note 134, § 9. 
383. Germany needs labor from outside, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text, and therefore 
cannot shut its borders. Given this, the only way Germany could stop de facto immigration in the future 
would be to insist that workers enter only for a set time, and must leave at the end. This was, in fact, the 
idea behind the Gastafbeiter program, which ilJustrates the problems with the approach. The first is 
political: a government is unlikely to be willing or able to carry out the widespread deportations such a 
policy would require. The second problem is legal: the Basic Law and the German Constitutional Court's 
interpretations have set precedents that would limit significantly the government's ability to so act. Any 
actions to change this would create the same problems: Germany would either have to reject the 
Veifassungsstaat or alter the Basic Law in such a way as to weaken or reject post-war Germany's 
commitment to civil and human rights. 
384. Schwerdtfeger, supra note 123, at 11. 
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B. The Integration Question 
Criticism of German naturalization policy has also been based on the assumption 
that claims to citizenship should not depend upon cultural assimilation. This is a 
criticism that comes especially easy to North Americans . . . . It is doubtful, 
however, whether the "melting pot" model is suitable for relatively small and 
overcrowded European states like the Federal Republic of Germany.385 
For the past two decades the German government has officially proclaimed 
a policy that long-term resident foreigners (especially those born and raised 
in Germany) should be "integrated" into German society.386 This policy 
derives largely from government recognition of problems caused by the end 
of the guest-worker program in 1973. As it became increasingly clear that 
many foreign residents in Germany wanted to remain and even to bring their 
families, the government began to use the term "integration" to describe its 
policy that "foreigners who live and work here should be dealt with so that 
they feel included and at home. "387 As a general policy goal virtually no one 
other than the far right disagrees with the idea of integration, but there are 
significant debates over what the meaning and content of the policy are and 
should be.388 
In the government's eyes this policy "requires" aliens "to accustom 
themselves above all to the values, norms and ways of living prevailing here. 
Respect for our culture and the principles of our constitution . . . abandon-
ment of excessive national [and] religious behaviors . . . are the prerequisites 
which have to be fulfilled. "389 The government defends this view of the 
integration policy by proclaiming that the tolerance of the German people for 
diversity is limited. According to this view, "the hospitality of our people and 
the capacity of our society to accept integration of people from other countries 
should not be overtaxed. Both have limits and these limits must be 
respected. "390 As a result, integration depends on "uncompromising restric-
tions on further immigration from non-EC member states. "391 
The argument that this official pessimism about German tolerance derives 
from the fact that Germany is too crowded is not necessarily persuasive.392 
385. Hailbronner, supra note 37, at 72. 
386. E.g., THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, PUB. No. VII 1-937 020115, SURVEY OF THE 
POllCY AND LAW REGARDING AUENS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBllC OF GERMANY 1 (1989) ("Aliens living 
permanently in our country are to be integrated into our economic, social and legal system and may rest 
assured that they shall be given the opportunity to participate to the maximum extent possible in the social 
life in the Federal Republic of Germany.") (Federal Ministry of the Interior trans.) [hereinafter 1989 
SURVEY]. 
387. Verhandlungen des DeutschenBundestages, 9. Wahlperiode, Stenogr. Berichte [Official Records 
of the German Parliament, 9th Period, Stenographer's Report] 35-36. 
388. Schwerdtfeger, supra note 123, at 12. 
389. 1989 SURVEY, supra note 386, at 2-3. 
390. Eckhard Schiffer, Vor der Neuregelung des Ausllinderrechts, 1990 ZAR 51, 52 (author's 
translation). 
391. 1989 SURVEY, supra note 386, at 3. 
392. In 1989 the former Federal Republic had a population density of 249 per square kilometer, 
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Integration of non-ethnic Germans has long been a fundamental dilemma for 
Germany, even before it was exacerbated by demographic or economic 
factors. Thus, contrary to popular belief, Jews were highly integrated into 
German society before the rise of Nazism;393 however, integration of the 
type proposed above was always problematic. 394Pinally, the official pessi-
mism about German tolerance fails to account for the continuing presence in 
German law of provisions based on vlJlkisch conceptions. Aussiedler are 
admitted into Germany on the basis of ethnicity despite the real possibility of 
cultural differences, while naturalization laws make it difficult for foreigners, 
even those who may be culturally quite assimilated, to obtain citizenship. 
Instead, they remain as a resident "foreign" group. These factors mean that 
the federal government's policy of integration is unlikely to be taken seriously 
by those to whom it matters most. 
Some oppose the government's view. These opponents argue that Germany 
should allow non-Germans to maintain their own cultures even while living 
in Germany. They express their aspiration to this pluralistic ideal not only as 
the result of necessity, but as a positive good.395 One German commentator 
has noted that "culture is always hard to define and certainly not static," and 
argued that cnu/csu style cultural integration may even be unconstitu-
tional.396 German commentators describe these two views as "full integra-
tion" or complete assimilation, which is the cnu ideal, and "pluralistic 
making it one of the most densely populated states in Europe, and the former German Democratic 
Republic had a density of 154 per square kilometer, meaning that after reunification Germany arguably 
has more open territory for settlement. U.N DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMBNT 
STATISTICAL OFFICE, 1988/89 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, U.N. Doc. ST/ESAISTAT/SER.S/13, U.N. Sales 
No. EIF.91.XVII.I, at 69 (1992). 
393. As Hannah Arendt has noted: 
In no other country had there been anything like the short period of true assimilation so decisive 
for the history of German Jews, when the real vanguard of a people not only accepted Jews, but 
was even strangely eager to associate with them. Nor did this attitude ever completely disappear 
from German society. To the very end traces of it could easily be discerned. 
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 6S (3d ed., 1966). 
394. See id. at 64. 
395. Dieter Oberndorfer, for example, points out that "culture" grows and develops from pluralistic 
contact. He concludes rather optimistically that 
The preconditions for a politically and socially integrated multi-elhnic society in the Federal 
Republic of Germany are better than many believe. After two murderous World Wars and the 
catastrophe of 1945, which mark as deep an impression in German history as the Reformation 
and the Thirty Years War, volkisch nationalism in the BRD has lost its intellectual strength and 
ideological legitimacy. Its myths have broken down. Its goal, the unity of German·speaking 
peoples in one state is Utopian. The oft-cited hatred of foreigners in the BRD finally today has 
primarily economic and group-specific sources. 
Dieter Oberndorfer, Die Verfassungsprinizipien der Republik und des Nationalstaates 11-12 (author's 
translation) (unpublished paper on file with author). 
396. Oberndorfer argues that government pressure to conform to German religious or cultural models 
violates GG arts. 4(1) ("freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom to profess a religion or a particular 
philosophy [Weitanschauuung] shall be inviolable") and 4(2) ("the undisturbed practice of religion shall 
be guaranteed. "). ld. at 12. See also ASYLRECHT & FREMDBNFBINDUCHKEIT [Green Party magazine], 
May 16, 1992, at 3-9. 
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integration," which they perceive as the U.S. ideal.397 
The German integration debate takes place against the background of the 
kein Einwanderungsland principle which completely fails to support 
immigration as an ideal. Given this, German opponents of pluralistic 
integration cannot assert, as American opponents of U.S. multiculturalism 
can, that II [t]he genius of America lies in its capacity to forge a single nation 
from peoples of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins .... 
The American Creed envisages a nation composed of individuals making their 
own choices ... not a nation based on inviolable ethnic communities. 11398 
Whatever the truth of this position, it certainly adds a strong historical 
resonance to the assimilationist argument in the United States, one not 
available in Germany. What, then, is the basis of the German argument for 
assimilation? German supporters of multi-cuIturalism argue that assimilation 
policy is primarily a belief that foreigners are a threat. They charge that the 
government is not in fact genuinely committed to the very integration it 
espouses. Thus, in a published response to the government's new Aliens Law 
proposal in 1990, a church and labor coalition wrote that lithe proposed.1aw 
still sees foreigners as a potential danger and hardly bears the traits of a new 
p&rtnership .... It is neither 'open' nor 'liberal. ".399 . 
C. The "First Commitment" Toward Ethnic Germans 
The Aussiedler program presents unusual conceptual difficulties for 
German policy towards "foreigners. II The government stresses ostensibly 
objective reasons for limiting the entry and naturalization of foreigners while 
welcoming theAussiedler. For example, the Interior Ministry distributes slick, 
glamorous brochures with catchy titles like Ihre Heimat Sind Wir ("We Are 
Your Homeland "). One question and answer excerpt is especially illuminating: 
Are settlers foreigners? 
All of these groups - foreign workers, applicants for asylum, German Aussiedler 
and tlbersiedler - come from 'without,' from outside Germany - but the 
similarity ends there. For they came for different reasons, with different intentions 
and expectations. Aussiedler are not foreigners. Foreign workers even if they stay 
a long time maintain the option of return to their homeland. . .. [political 
refugees] want to return if political conditions in their homelands change. With 
German Aussiedler from the east however, the situation is different: they have 
come to stay.400 
397. See, e.g., QUARITSCH, supra note 303, at 46-66 (1981) (criticizing pluralistic integration); 
Schwerdtfeger, supra note 123, at 12-13 (championing pluralistic integration). Note, however, that this 
debate in Germany, while similar in some ways to current U.S. debates, is framed in its own unique terms 
and does not replicate that in this country. 
398. SCID.ESINGER, supra note 24, at 134. 
399. CKUMENISCHER VORBEREITUNGSAUSSCHUBZUR WOCHE DER AUSLANDISCHENMITBORGER UND 
DER BUNDESVORSTAND DES DEUTSCHEN GEWERKSCHAFfSBUNDES (DGB), FOR EIN HUMANES 
AUSLANDERREClIT (author's translation) (on file with author). 
400. AKnoN GEMEINSINN, lHRE HEIMAT SIND WIR 5 (1989) (author's translation). 
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This argument is faulty. The fundamental difference between the two 
groups cannot be based solely or even primarily on intention. It is obvious 
that many former guest workers (let alone their children and grandchildren) 
have no intention of "returning" (or going) anywhere. Aussiedler also 
"maintain the option" to return to their non-German "homeland" as long as 
they are status Germans rather than full German citizens. Moreover, German 
law itself generally requires applicants for naturalization to renounce other 
citizenships. Political refugees' desire to return to their homeland varies 
greatly among groups and may diminish over time. In any case, while the 
intention of entering aliens may be a criterion for distinguishing among 
"foreigners" such as resident aliens and immigrants who seek citizenship, it 
can hardly be the sine qua non of "foreignness. " 
The brochure from the Interior Ministry also makes the circular argument 
that Aussiedler are not foreigners under German law because German law 
does not categorize Aussiedler as foreigners. However, the pamphlet also 
offers a more candid reason for the distinction between Aussiedler and 
foreigners: "Every nation, whether English or Spanish, French, Polish or 
Italian, feels for its own people a special responsibility - so do we." This 
statement expresses openly the opinion which seems to have lurked beneath 
the surface of many of the legal distinctions and policy formulations presented 
so far - the viJlkisch conception of the German people and nation. Despite the 
transitory, historically unique characterization of Article 116(1), much 
German discourse about immigration implicitly contains a restrictive, mono-
cultural, viJlkisch conception which Germans usually are unwilling to express 
in too clear or strong a form. A widespread reluctance to discuss the 
distinction betweenAussiedler and foreigners reflects the deep tension between 
the viJlkisch idea and that of the Constitutional state (Veifassungsstaat) and 
impedes clear debate over the deepest political questions facing Germany 
today. Perhaps it is unfair to expect more from what are essentially political 
slogans. However, these slogans are powerful because they present the 
essence of subtle and complex ideas in a way that appeals to the German 
public without being overtly dissonant with other important values held by 
German culture. 
On the other hand, the fact that "Germany for Germans" or Ein Volk-Ein 
Reich-Ein Fuhrer are not acceptable phrases in current public discourse 
demonstrates that much in the constitutional, legal, ideological, and cultural 
make-up of Germany today is antithetical to viJlkisch nationalism. This, 
ultimately, is the reason that the asylum and foreigners issues are among the 
most important facing Germany today. 
208 
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 209 1993
German Law of Asylum, Immigration, and Citizenship 
V. CONCLUSION 
Post-war German immigration law embodies a deep tension between a 
mono-cultural, volkisch conception of Germany and a broader vision based 
upon general human rights principles. On the one hand, the combination of 
Article 16 (the asylum clause), assiduous review of asylum cases, and the 
Federal Constitutional Court's expansion of aliens' rights has made Germany 
a state remarkably protective of non-citizens. Article 16, in particular, has 
come to signify a general societal commitment to human rights and openness 
to foreigners, even if many believe that this openness has been abused. On the 
other hand, Article 116(1) (the ethnic German expellee clause) represents an 
implicitly volkisch vision, even if it is viewed in increasing measure as a 
transitory provision that arose from a unique historical situation. In addition, 
the statutes governing citizenship, aliens, and the Aussiedler, both as written 
and as applied, reflect this more traditional ethno-cultural conception of the 
German nation-state. 
The German dilemma over asylum,401 immigration, and citizenship is 
deep and poignant. Generous legal structures crafted in the post-war period 
as both atonement for and prophylaxis against National Socialism seem now 
to contribute to its resurgence. While it is important not to overstate the 
current volkisch threat to post-war German constitutional democracy, the 
rising political power of the right402 and the tendency of even the SPD to 
capitulate to the growing political power of the extreme right403 are signifi-
cant. One can hardly imagine a worse response to the situation, however, than 
Chancellor Kohl's threat to declare a state of emergency and suspend the 
constitution. Apart from potential jurisprudential defects, such an approach 
conjures up painful echoes of the 1930s by its sweeping rejection of the 
asylum clause, regular legislative and judicial mechanisms, and the Veifassun-
gstaat ("constitutional state") itself. 
The agreement between the major parties to amend Article 16 at least 
401. It would be a serious mistake to deny the reality of the German asylum crisis: the numbers are 
staggering, the COSls immense, and the political and social pressures real. It would be an equally serious 
mistake, however, to view this crisis as simply an administrative or legal one; it has significant political 
and social aspecls. 
402. A number of recent evenlS illustrate this. Helmut Kohl's hinlS in early 1990 that he might not 
accept Germany's Oder-Neisse border with Poland as final, for example, was undoubtedly aimed at 
shoring up support on the right; similarly, Kohl shocked foreign observers early in 1992 by meeting with 
Kurt Waldheim to gain right-wing support in state elections in Baden-Wiirttembergand Schleswig-Holstein. 
Marc Fischer, Kohl's Party Veer.s Right in Bid to Hold Key State in Sunday's Vote, WASH. POST, Apr. 
3, 1992, at A26; John Tagliabue, Waldheim is Given Welcome by Kohl, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1992, at 
1. 
403. In Bremen, for instance, the SPD ultimately agreed to support limiting the number of asylum 
applicanlS, in light of the strong showing by the right-wing extremist parties. Gerard Braunthal, Right 
Wing Extremism in Germany Today 14 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Journal of 
International Law). 
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maintains the general commitment to the rule of constitutional law. The 
question is, however, whether such an amendment is necessary to address the 
asylum problem. It is far from clear that statutory solutions have been funded 
or pursued with sufficient government vigor. More expeditious administrative 
proceedings are not beyond the capacity of the German state. If, as the 
government argues, the real problem lies with judicial review of administra-
tive denials, those proceedings could also be accomplished more quickly. In 
light of these issues, the SPD was correct in its prior insistence on legislative 
solutions in this area. 
The call to amend the Basic Law is based less on pragmatic legal reality 
than on political discourse. Amendment of Article 16 will send a clear 
message that German asylum law was too liberal and that large numbers of 
people abused the system. If the amendment of Article 16 is the only response 
to the crisis, the response will signify the rejection of an important pillar of 
Germany's post-war commitment to human rights, and will tilt the balance in 
public discourse in favor of the ethno-cultural conceptions of state embodied 
in Article 116 and the citizenship statutes. 
A more coherent and appropriate long-term policy is possible. The asylum 
crisis can serve as a catalyst for a resolution of the deep tensions that have 
characterized post-war German immigration law. If Article 16 is amended, 
that profound change should be balanced by changes in the statutory schemes 
governing citizenship and the Aussiedler. Such changes would recognize the 
demographic and historical reality that "Germany has never belonged only to 
the Germans and will not in the future, "404 and would make an important 
statement about post-reunification Germany's perception of itself. The 
citizenship laws' legal disenfranchisement of the millions of foreigners in 
Germany has isolated foreigners and has contributed to their being targeted 
for right-wing violence. Furthermore, given the dramatic decline in the 
German birthrate and the consequent "greying" of the population, all Germans 
have a strong pragmatic interest in encouraging further immigration.405 
Indeed, German commentators have noted that immigrants are already crucial 
to the German labor force.406 
Three changes to the statutory law are the best way to begin. First, 
Germany should loosen its strict reliance on the jus sanguinis principle, at the 
very least granting German-born foreigners the right to naturalize upon 
404. KNIGlIT & KOWALSKY, supra note 81, at 37 ("Deutschland hat nie nur den Deutschen gehOrt 
und wird es auch nicht im Zukunft. "). 
405. The German birthrate sank from 2.5 to 1.4 children per woman by 1990; some projections 
indicate a possible population decline to under 40 million by the year 2030. See id. at 30. 
406. Martin Frey of the Bundestag's research service recently stated that Germany needs 300,000 new 
foreigners annually to sustain its labor force. He also reported that 33,000 Turkish-owned business in 
Germany generated some 700,000 jobs in 1991. Gennan Economy Dependent on Foreigners, Study Says, 
WEEK IN GERMANY, Sept. 18, 1992, at 4. 
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majority. This would place Germany in the European mainstream, and send 
an important signal to the current foreigner population. The 1990 amendments 
to the, Aliens Law suggest that the prospects of such a change are good. 
Second, Germany should loosen the strict rules against dual nationality to 
allow, and more importantly to encourage foreigners to naturalize. Again, 
there seems to be some movement in this direction as the major parties discuss 
how to replace the ad hoc approach of the last three decades with a more 
systematic one. Finally, Germany should reclassify the Aussiedler as just 
another class of immigrants. Their historical and cultural ties to Germany 
might remain a factor in immigration decisions, but they would no longer be 
a special category of people derived from implicit volldsch assumptions. This 
fmal proposal is critical: without it, recent proposals to amend Article 16 will 
reduce the number of non-ethnic German asylum seekers without changing the 
number of ethnic Germans who enter Germany despite their meager cultural 
ties to 1990s Germany. Such a situation would send the worst possible signal 
both to the German people and to all others who see resurgent ethnic and 
volldsch nationalism as perhaps the most important political question of the 
post-Cold War era. 
While the political debate over these proposals would undoubtedly be 
great, the result would be worth the fight. German immigration law and 
policy would recognize demographic and historic reality while at the same 
time rejecting lingering volldsch assumptions. Discourse on immigration and 
citizenship questions could then be more open and honest and immigration law 
could provide a public forum for debate on the soul of the post-war German 
constitutional state. 
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